Report on biosafety at the Center for Disease Control by Center for Disease Control Task Force on Laboratory Safety.
REPORT
on
BIOSAFETY AT THE CENTER FOR D ISE A SE  CONTROL
by
THE TASK FORCE ON LABORATORY SAFETY







U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30333
MEMORANDUM DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFAREPUBLIC HEA LTH  SERVICE 
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
t o  : Director, CDC d a t e :
f r o m  Chairman, Task Force on Laboratory Safety
s u b j e c t :  Transmittal and Summary of Report
Transmitted herewith is the report of the Task Force on Laboratory Safety.
The Task Force was given the mission of identifying biohazards at CDC and 
recommending ways of abating these. The report contains many recommendations; 
however, we wish to call to your attention in this memorandum the more 
important findings and recommendations.
1. New facilities which incorporate the safest engineering and design 
features for handling hazardous agents should be constructed as soon as 
possible. The present facilities at Clifton Road and Chamblee are not 
adequate to handle many of the kinds of organisms now being studied.
Many laboratories do not meet the operational requirements published in 
Lab Safety at the CDC(l). Several stop-gap steps should be taken:
a) Provide adequate containment equipment (BSC), b) Provide adequate 
autoclaving facilities, c) Establish and enforce restricted areas of 
access, d) Provide clean areas for eating, drinking, and smoking.
2. An Office of Biosafety with expanded staff and range of competence 
should be established and separated from other functions presently 
performed by the Office of Biosafety. Duties assigned to this Office 
should be exclusively those relating to the control of biohazards at 
all CDC stations. These duties should include monitoring, control, 
consultation, investigation, training, and research.
3. A Biohazard Control Committee should be established to serve as 
technical advisors to the Office of Biosafety. The Director of the 
Office of Biosafety should report the progress of the biosafety program 
to the Biohazard Committee at regular intervals. The Committee should 
be composed of a small number (possibly 5 or 6) of highly knowledgeable 
individuals, such as a virologist, bacteriologist, physician, 
epidemiologist and environmental engineer. The Committee would assist
in identifying needs; provide support, advice, and guidance to all aspects 
of the CDC biosafety program; and report on a regular basis to the 
Director, CDC.
4. Longterm measures should include: a) Developing a functioning 
employee immunization program, b) Developing a plan for medical 
surveillance of illness among CDC employees, c) Establishing a biosafety 
training program, d) Revising the CDC Lab Safety manual, e) Reviewing 
and improving procedures for identifying infectious agents in animal 
quarters, f) Requiring protective garments to be worn while working in 
the lab and street clothing to be worn elsewhere, g) Prohibiting
Page 2 - Director, CDC
infectious materials to be taken from the laboratory areas except in tightly 
closed containers, h) Opening all specimens suspected of containing Class 4 
agents only in the Maximum Containment Laboratory, i) Centrifuging infectious 
materials only in safety cups or in centrifuges housed in containment cabinets.
In addition to the summaries in the attached report, all of the returned 
questionnaires and analyses, interview notes, employee written comments, and 
Task Force notes are available for further study and analysis.
The Task Force studied only safety problems directly related to biohazards; 
however, we received several comments about chemical hazards. Personnel in 
some chemistry laboratories (toxicology) are concerned about the possibility 
of being exposed to infectious agents in specimens submitted for chemical 
analysis; so a similar study for these hazards may be indicated.
<John E. Forney, Ph.D. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Biosafety at the Center for Disease Control (CDC) has always been 
of primary concern to employees at all levels because of the nature of 
much of the research, diagnostic work, and training they conduct. Before 
the present facilities were constructed considerable thought and research 
went into planning and design of the physical arrangement and the air 
handling equipment. Also before occupying these facilities, procedures 
were established for handling and disposing of infectious materials 
representing various degree of hazards (1). However, during the 17 years 
in which the present facilities have been occupied, there have been 
numerous modifications of buildings and air handling systems. Safety 
procedures have also been revised and in some instances ignored. Etiologic 
agents of disease whose existence was unknown when the original planning 
was done are being isolated, identified, and studied. Numerous instances 
of illness have occurred among CDC employees which were related to their 
employment at CDC. The death of two employees from Rocky Mountain spotted 
fever (2) stimulated the formation of this task force to review the 
facilities, policies, procedures and practices relating to biosafety and 
to attempt to assess the gap between procedures and practices.
The Task Force was appointed by the Director, CDC, on March 9, 1977, 
as follows:
Dr. John V. Bennett Dr. Robert H. Huffaker
Dr. Adrian Chappell Mr. Norman J. Petersen
Mr. Robert J. Cotton Mr. Leslie G. Schaum
Dr. Paul M. Feorino Mr. Bradford P. Smith
Dr. John E. Forney, Chm. Mr. David Weathers
Subsequently, Dr. William J. Martone was appointed to the Task Force 
by the Chairman.
The Task Force first met on March 14, 1977, and then daily for the 
next two weeks. During the first meeting, Dr. David J. Sencer, then 
Director, CDC, and Dr. Roslyn Q. Robinson, Director, Bureau of Laboratories, 
discussed with the Task Force some aspects of the biosafety program which 
they believed should be studied. The Task Force decided to collect data 
for use in preparing final recommendations by four means: (a) interviews 
with CDC employees, (b) personal observations and inspections, (c) review of 
records and published procedures, and (d) questionnaires distributed to 
all CDC employees including those stationed at Fort Collins, Colorado; 
Phoenix, Arizona; San Juan, Puerto Rico; Cincinnati, Ohio; and Morgantown, 
West Virginia.
INTERVIEWS
A. Members of the Task Force assisted by Mr. Jerry Brimberry and
Mr. James D. Lewis, interviewed all but two or three employees from
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Building 7 (virology laboratory building). Representative personnel 
from the Technical Services Branch and from Engineering Services 
were also interviewed (Exhibit 1).
B. The Task Force as a whole interviewed Dr. H. Bruce Dull, Chairman
of the Medical Advisory Board; Dr. Richard E. Dixon, Chairman of the 
committee studying the circumstances surrounding the deaths of two 
employees from Rocky Mountain spotted fever; Dr. John Richardson,
Director of the Office of Biosafety; Dr. George H. Connell, Chairman 
of the CDC Safety Committee; and Dr. Lonnie C. Jenkins, of the CDC 
clinic.
OBSERVATIONS AND INSPECTIONS
Members of the Task Force conducted a floor-by-floor inspection 
of Building 7, with special attention to the direction of airflow in each 
laboratory. The Task Force also directed its attention to the manner in 
which materials are handled in the central autoclave rooms. One member 
of the Task Force conducted a similar room-by-room and floor-by-floor 
inspection of Building 5, and Buildings 6, 7, and 21 at Chamblee.
PROCEDURES
The staffing and duty assignments of the Office of Biosafety were 
reviewed. Other documents studied were the CDC LABORATORY SAFETY manual (3), 
the operating procedures of the Data and Specimen Handling (DASH) activity 
and Technical Services, and the records of servicing the biological safety 
cabinets.
QUESTIONNAIRES
The Task Force broke into four subcommittees and prepared questionnaires 
for these four groups: nonlaboratory personnel, support and service personnel, 
laboratory bench workers, and laboratory supervisors. Ms. Jeannine Connell 
and Mr. Albert M. Barber helped prepare the questionnaires. Responses to 
items on the questionnaires covered the past six months. The numbers of 
questionnaires distributed and the percentages returned are:
Nonlaboratorians 











Data from all questionnaires were stored in the computer. Comments received 
on many of the questionnaires have been summarized.
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Problems identified fell into several broad categories:





f) Office of Biosafety
Therefore, the problems and recommendations will be presented under 
these headings.
Although data were collected from CDC locations other than 1600 
Clifton Road, the Task Force's principal effort was directed toward the 
problems at 1600 Clifton Road. Insofar as similar problems exist at other 
sites, however, the same recommendations apply.
While the Task Force was collecting data, analyzing information and 
formulating recommendations, several memoranda were issued and several 
procedural changes made. These are presented in Exhibit 2.
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During the past 17 years the CDC facilities at 1600 Clifton Road have 
been frequently and, in some instances, extensively remodeled to provide 
space for new programs. In some instances, expediency has dictated the 
use of existing facilities rather than building ideal facilities to meet a 
functional need. As new techniques are developed for culturing etiologic 
agents of disease, more highly infectious agents can be and are being 
cultivated. Furthermore, for such purposes as antigen production, large 
quantities must be produced. Thus, any mishap or breach of technique has 
the potential for extensive contamination of workers and the environment. 
This is particularly of concern where expediency has required that organisms 
be handled in facilities with less than optimal containment.
Great reliance is placed upon a properly functioning air handling 
system which incorporates the principle of one-pass air through labora­
tories, with increased localized control created by negative pressure (Class
1) cabinets. The airflow in some areas is so delicately balanced that 
even a slight disruption or malfunction may reverse the direction of 
airflow in a laboratory or biological safety cabinet (BSC). This condition 
has been reported in the questionnaires, comments, and interviews, and 
by members of this Task Force.
PROBLEM
1. Building 7, 1600 Clifton Road
A. This building is too readily accessible to the general public. 
Persons with no real need to be in the building can enter 
directly from the parking lot or the catwalks connecting it 
with other CDC buildings. The only barriers are warning signs 
on all outer doors and these are frequently ignored. Because 
of this easy access, even employees who work in the building 
have no "psychological" barrier and no sense of entering a more 
hazardous area. Furthermore, there is no barrier between office 
and administrative areas and laboratory areas, so management and 
clerical personnel are at risk of being directly exposed to 
infectious agents accidentally released into the environment.
B. Building 7 is designed to have negative pressure in the labora­
tories relative to that in the corridors. However, because of 
extensive modifications which have been made in some areas, and 
some basic deficiencies in the building design, this condition 
does not always exist. Some labs always have positive pressure, 
(i.e., air blows out into corridors), and some have positive 
pressure at one time and negative pressure at another. In some 
laboratories the air flows from the small rooms that contain the 
BSC's into the main laboratory room. Therefore, the plan for 
airflow from the cleaner areas into the less clean areas is 
constantly compromised and the danger of infection is increased.
II. FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT
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Air flow direction was checked in Building 5. Air from 
rooms 108, 131, 136, 318, and 319 flowed strongly outward into 
the corridor. Rooms B12, 234, 312, and 318 were being used with 
the corridor doors open so the direction of airflow was difficult 
to assess. An attempt should be made to readjust the airflow in 
this building also.
C. In Building 7 there is currently little or no differentiation 
among laboratories in which work with Class 2, Class 3, or poten­
tially Class 4 agents is performed (4). Basically, the physical 
layout of all the Building 7 laboratories is the same, even 
though work is performed on viruses in 14 different CDC precaution 
categories. These categories reflect a large range of potential 
biohazards. The basic design of most of the labs is adequate 
only for working with low hazard viruses or other agents (Class
2); it is not adequate for working with moderate or high hazard 
viruses or agents (Clases 3 and 4).
D. The design of Building 7 is such that there is no real separation 
between clean and dirty areas; and because of the erratic airflow 
patterns, no particular area can be guaranteed clean. In fact, 
calling some areas "clean" leads to a false sense of security.
The only "clean" lunch area is a small room which looks out upon 
racks of contaminated material waiting to be autoclaved.
E. Building 7 is poorly designed for virus work, crowded, and 
cluttered. The numerous places where dust and dirt can collect 
include light fixtures, the utility pipes, the air ducts, 
external shelves, cabinets that do not go to the ceiling, ledges 
that are cracked and discontinuous, and the tops of BSC's. 
Functions of different hazard levels cannot be properly segregated 
because the building is so crowded that all space has to be fully 
utilized. Because of a lack of storage space, the building is 
cluttered with glassware, and equipment is permanently stored on 
ledges and even in BSC's. Because of lack of adequate office 
space for professional personnel, work cubicles are jointly used 
for technical and office work.
F. Inspection of Building 5 and Buildings 6, 7, and 21 at Chamblee 
disclosed that Class 3 bacteria and fungi are being worked with 
in these locations. The facilities available for this purpose 
are inadequate because of problems with air handling, inadequate 
provision for terminal sterilization, and insufficient containment 
equipment.
RECOMMENDATION
We conclude (a) that Buildings 5 and 7 and Buildings 6, 7, and 21 
at Chamblee are inherently unsafe for much of the work being performed in 
them, (b) that CDC should provide working facilities that are as safe as
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possible for the employees, and (c) that because of CDC's worldwide 
stature it should have "showcase" facilities to demonstrate to health 
officials who come here, how hazardous work can best be performed. We 
therefore recommend that new facilities be constructed which will meet 
these requirements.
A high-level containment building suitable for handling Class 3 and 4 
organisms and the large volumes of Class 1 and 2 organisms now being 
produced in Building 7 as well as in Building 5, and Buildings 6, 7, and 
21 at Chamblee is essential and should ideally have at least the following 
design characteristics:
1. One-story style construction
2. Restricted areas, i.e., by card, airlock, or other type of 
barrier
3. Well-engineered air handling system
4. Intralaboratory decontamination and sterilization facilities
5. Facilities for terminal decontamination of liquid effluent 
from containment areas
6. Separation of laboratory and office space
7. Animal facilities including space for conducting aerosol 
experiments
8. Facilities for conducting training in containment of DNA 
experiments as well as other hazardous procedures
9. Preferably located in a sparsely populated area.
Buildings 8 and 9 meet many of these design characteristics, but they 
are too small to support the present workload of CDC laboratories with 
hazardous agents and therefore restrict work to only a few Class 4 viral 
agents.
We recognize the inevitable time lag in the funding and construction of 
new facilities. Therefore certain "stop-gap" alterations must be instituted 
to reduce the biohazards in the present facilities.
PROBLEM
2. Biological Safety Cabinets
A. There have been repeated reports of malfunctioning negative
pressure cabinets (BSC), i.e., insufficient airflow, variation in 
airflow, and even reversal of airflow. Of the 149 laboratory 
supervisors who responded to the questionnaire, 33% of those 
who work with Class 3 agents and 43% of those who work with 
Class 4 agents reported instances of malfunction of cabinets.
In interviews of 63 scientific personnel in Building 7 who work 
with cabinets, 57% did not believe the BSC to be functioning 
correctly. Members of the safety committee tested all of the 
BSC's in Building 7 and found that all but two were functioning
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below 75 linear feet per minute, the airflow required to meet 
safety standards; indeed, all but two had airflow of less than 
50 linear feet per minute and some showed essentially no air move­
ment. Furthermore, most of the BSC's are in small rooms where 
door movements drastically affect airflow patterns.
B. Another difficulty associated with the BSC's is that the airflow 
is shut off in the evening between 4:30 and 5:00 p.m. as an 
economy measure. This often results in a loss of airflow while 
laboratorians are still working, exposing them to infectious 
material. Twenty-three percent of the laboratory workers in Buil 
ding 7 who use BSC's indicated that this had occurred while they 
were using a BSC after 4:30. In addition, almost all workers 
using BSC's reported unscheduled shutdown of exhaust fans during 
the usual work day. Currently, the only exhaust air that is fil­
tered is the air going through the BSC. When this airflow is 
stopped, contaminated air spills out into the room and eventually 
leaves the building without being filtered.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. All BSC's should be critically and repeatedly checked for proper 
function. If they cannot be made to operate at 75 linear feet 
per minute air velocity, they should be repaired or replaced.
Repair might consist of increasing airflow, installing larger 
motors and more effective fans or installing glove ports.
If repair is not possible, the cabinets should be replaced with 
vertical laminar flow biological safety cabinets (Class II, 
type 1) that protect both the worker and the material being worked 
with. Many cabinets are in small rooms that are drastically 
affected by the opening of doors. The room air-cabinet interaction 
should be checked. All of this effort should be coordinated 
with a review of the hazard level of the work being performed so 
that hazard and containment level are in consonance.
B. Shutting off the building and BSC airflow at 4:30-5:00 p.m. saves 
energy, but creates a biohazard in the labs if work is still in 
progress. Either all work must stop at that time or a compromise 
be reached to leave the air on to a later time.
PROBLEM
3. Autoclaves
A. Personnel in five Virology Branches in Building 7, and three
Mycology Branches, and four Bacteriology Branches in Building 5 
work with Class 3 agents. None of the laboratories in which 
these employees work contains an autoclave for decontaminating 
discarded material. This means that highly infectious material
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must be taken out of the laboratory, carted through the halls to 
the "dirty glassware" rack at the end of each floor (sometimes 
next to the elevators) and left there until space is available 
in the community autoclave. Consequently, infectious material 
may remain untreated overnight or over a weekend. This procedure 
affords multiple opportunities for accidents to occur, both 
through spillage and aerosol exposure. The proximity of dirty 
glassware to the elevator shaft is particularly distressing and 
raises serious speculations as to airborne hazards.
B. There is no autoclave for contaminated material in the SSB of 
Building 7. Therefore, contaminated material is carted down the 
hall, placed in an elevator, taken off at some other floor, and 
left on a dirty glassware rack to be autoclaved when space is 
available in a community autoclave. Since personnel in the two 
Branches located in the SSB work with Class 3 and Class 4 viruses, 
the biohazard is clearly evident and indefensible.
C. Condensate drains for almost all dirty glassware autoclaves are 
open to the autoclave room or pipechase. There is evidence as 
well as opinion that aerosols of infectious agents are discharged 
from the open drains as the autoclave cycle is begun. Since the 
temperature of the initially exhausted air-vapor mixture is not 
very high, it may contain infectious material.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Each laboratory in which work with Class 3 or 4 agents is performed 
should contain an autoclave so that contaminated material can be 
autoclaved before it leaves the laboratory area.
B. The condensate drains should be sealed as soon as possible.
C. Performance of autoclaves must be monitored during each cycle 




A. Building 6 has the same problems with airflow, cabinets, and 
autoclaves as the other buildings. Air balance between animal 
quarters and office space is critical and every effort should be 
made to keep office areas under positive pressure in relation to 
the animal quarters.
B. There are no adequate containment facilities for especially 
infectious animals such as influenza-infected ferrets.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
A. An engineering study should be made of the air handling equipment 
with particular attention to "fail-safe" and back up systems to 
prevent air from animal quarters being forced into office areas.
B. The need for BSC's in the animal quarters should be reviewed and 
appropriate cabinets purchased.




Of 149 laboratory supervisors questioned, 30% indicated that at 
least one specimen container had been broken in the last six months 
while being centrifuged. This type of accident produces an extensive 
aerosol, and the centrifuge is difficult to decontaminate. Such 
accidents, therefore, present definite biohazards.
RECOMMENDATION
Purchase and use of safety screw cap centrifuge containers should be 
mandatory for centrifuging infectious agents as this will reduce aerosol 
formation to the zero level. In some situations the centrifuge should be 
housed in a containment cabinet with filtered exhaust.
PROBLEM
6. Discard pans
Employees complained that discard pans issued to the laboratories 
occasionally develop leaks. This permits contamination of the 
environment.
RECOMMENDATION
All discard pans should be checked under pressure in a water tank 
before being issued to the laboratories.
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1. Access to Laboratories
Persons other than those working in laboratory areas frequently 
visit those areas. Of the nonlaboratory personnel, 130 (9.7%) 
reported going into infectious disease labs for duty reasons and 19 
(1.47%) went for social reasons. Laboratory workers reported receiving 
294 duty visits and 227 social visits. They also received 235 visits 
from non-CDC persons. There were 54 reports of children being seen 
in the lab areas and 3 reports of children in the animal quarters.
There were many unstructured comments on this subject emphasizing that 
access to CDC laboratories needs to be drastically restricted.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. High hazard areas should be "off limits" except to authorized 
persons wearing a distinctive identification
B. As an alternative, high hazard areas should be locked, and entry 
permitted only by key or use of an electronic card
C. All non-CDC personnel should be escorted to laboratories after 
receiving necessary clearance from the laboratory supervisor
D. A conference area with several rooms or cubicles should be provided 
for meetings outside of high hazard areas
PROBLEM
2. Written Procedures - "Lab Safety at the Center for Disease Control"
Ignorance of the CDC Lab Safety manual was widely expressed. Fifty- 
nine percent of the service and support personnel said they had never 
seen the manual. Forty-three percent of the bench workers said they 
did not have a copy in their lab or did not know if they had one.
As for supervisors 90% of the males and all of the females were 
knowledgeable about the CDC safety manual.
Several employees commented that the safety manual is difficult 
to use, is inadequate, and needs to be revised.
RECOMMENDATION
The CDC safety manual should be revised and better organized. Authorship 
should be vested in one person with a technically knowledgeable Biohazards 




given to dividing the manual into sections which would be of principal inter­
est to (a) non-laboratorians (b) support and service personnel, (c) bench 
workers and (d) supervisors. A copy of the manual should be given to every 
new employee. Every employee should be required to sign a statement that 
he or she has read or had explained the appropriate portions of the manual, 
and the statement should be placed in the employee's personnel file.
PROBLEM
3. Personal Habits
This general problem has many aspects. First is the habit of smoking, 
eating, or drinking in a laboratory. Among service and support 
personnel 61% customarily eat in a lunchroom in the building where 
they work. Others eat in the following locations: clean lab — 22 (12%), 
infectious lab— 3 (1%), animal room— 8 (4%), corridor to animal room—18 
(10%), glassware wash room—18 (10%), sterile glassware processing 
room— 12 (7%), glassware processing room—10 (6%), autoclave room— 10 
(6%), office in their building— 91 (51%), corridor adjacent to infectious 
lab—18 (10%), restroom— 48 (27%), cage-washing room—14 (8%), and pipe 
chase—18 (10%).
Approximately 75% of the bench workers eat and drink in the labs, and 




Eat in lab 52% 28% 18%
Smoke in lab 35% 38% 42%
Drink in lab 63% 48% 42%
These responses show that many employees eat, drink, and smoke in areas 
where they may be exposed to infectious agents. While the risks to those 
working with low-hazard agents or those working in office space separated 
from the lab work areas is small, these practices nevertheless 
increase risks from infections.
RECOMMENDATION
Obviously, the cafeteria and "The Other Place" are not meeting the 
needs of all employees for a place to smoke, eat, and drink. These places 
would be inadequate if all employees took their coffee and coke breaks and 
ate their brown-bag lunches there. Therefore a room, or rooms with tables 
and chairs, and vending machines should be provided in a central location 
for smoking, eating, and drinking.
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4. Protective Clothing
Service and support personnel change clothes before leaving the work 
area 53% of the time. Bench workers discard their lab coats 62% of 
the time, but reuse them the rest of the time. Protective clothing 
is usually discarded into open laundry bags. The bags are collected 
and taken to the laundry where the contents are emptied, sorted, 
and inspected for items left in pockets. This procedure creates a 
hazard to the laundry workers if the clothing is contaminated.
The wearing and use of protective clothing is not a uniform practice. 
Some workers wear street clothes in the laboratory with no protective 
clothing and go anywhere else with those clothes on. Others wear 
protective clothing anywhere; while still others change protective 
clothing when they leave the lab and then wear a clean coat anywhere.
RECOMMENDATION
Protective clothing is designed for use only while working in the 
laboratory and even if not contaminated is socially unacceptable anywhere 
else such as the cafeteria, credit union, or bank. Ideally, a protective 
garment should be worn while working in the lab and street clothes be worn 
elsewhere.
PROBLEM
5. Infectious Cultures or Suspensions
Occasionally infectious culture materials must be taken from one 
lab to another or to and from the animal facilities. These are some­
times carried in the hand, or in open baskets, or wire racks. Thus they 
are easily dropped or spilled in corridors or on catwalks. The cat­
walks in particular may be slippery from rain or ice, since they are 
exposed to the elements.
Re c o m m e n d a t i o n
Containers which can be closed tightly should be used for transporting 
infectious materials, tubes, syringes, etc., outside of laboratory areas.




Specimens containing Class 4 agents have been received and unpacked in 





All packages of specimens suspected of containing Class 4 agents should 
be opened only in the Maximum Containment Laboratory.
PROBLEM
7. Care, Handling, and Disposal of Laboratory Animals
Among service and support personnel only 25 (14%) stated that they 
usually knew which infectious agents were being used in animal rooms 
where they work. They get this information as follows:
No. %
By asking lab person 25 14
From sign on door 28 16
From clipboard in room 15 9
From supervisor 20 11
From label on cage 14 8
These responses indicate that personnel in this work category are 
not well informed of the hazards in rooms where they work.
Only twenty-four (14%) of the respondents were aware that they could 
acquire "B virus" from monkeys. A similar number responded that they 
always report monkey bites and scratches to a supervisor.
RECOMMENDATION
Better ways of providing identification of those agents which are 
inoculated into animals should be studied. For example, the identification 
sign should be on the door or on the wall near the door.
Support and service personnel should be given additional training 
and orientation in the hazards of their work.
Pr o b l e m
8* Enforcement of Safety Procedures
Responses from service and support personnel to the stated question 
are shown below:
"Do you feel that safety for CDC is taken seriously by:
Yes No Unknown
No. % No. % No. %
Your supervisor 105 59 28 16 44 24
Section Chief 80 45 28 16 69 39
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Yes No Unknown
No. % No. % No. %
Branch Chief 75 42 28 16 74 42
Division Director 71 40 25 14 81 46
Bureau Director 66 37 22 12 89 50
CDC Director 80 45 23 13 74 42
CDC Clinic 85 48 24 14 68 38
These figures indicate that except for the Director of CDC the further 
removed the supervisor is from the employee, the less confidence the 
employee has that the supervisor is concerned about safety.
Of the bench workers, 201 responded that they rigidly adhere to safety 
procedures but 122 responded "others" do not.
The supervisors responded affirmatively to the question: "Do you feel 
that there is adequate enforcement of biosafety requirements?" as 
follows:
< 1 year on job 35.7%
1-5 years 29.5%
> 5 years 20.0%
They stated a need for greater enforcement as follows:
< 1 year on job 14.3%
1-5 years 38.6%
> 5 years 47.1%
Re c o m m e n d a t i o n
Safety enforcement should be "tightened-up" starting with enforcement 
by management and descending through the organizational level to the first 
line supervisor who has primary responsibility for enforcement. Evaluation 
°f a supervisor's performance should include a statement of the degree to 
which he fulfills his responsibility for biosafety. Guidelines for 
disciplinary action should be developed in the event a supervisor fails 
Xli his responsibility. Such failure should be reviewed as necessary by the 
biohazards Committee and an explanation obtained from the supervisor.
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In interviews many employees expressed the view that managers at 
CDC are not sufficiently concerned about illnesses associated with 
laboratory work and that the CDC clinic personnel were not adequately 
caring for CDC employees. Over half (92, 55%) of the service and 
support personnel who responded to the questionnaire stated that they 
would go to the clinic for treatment of a minor cut, and 121 (75%) 
stated that they would go for a needle prick. Several employees 
said they would not go to the clinic even for a severe cut or animal 
bite.
There is a surprising lack of systematic effort to determine 
whether illness in an employee is caused by a laboratory-acquired 
infection. There is an obvious lack of consistency in perceived re­
sponsibilities for making such determinations, and in the actions 
supervisors take when they encounter suspected laboratory infections in 
employees. Supervisors of laboratories in which work with class 3 and 
4 agents is being done generally assume a much greater responsibility 
for seeking consultation and evaluation of employees. A lack of 
confidence in the CDC clinic is reflected by the fact that supervisors 
working with the more hazardous agents refer employees to CDC clinic 
Physicians less frequently than they do to other CDC physicians. The 
lack of consistency in providing diagnostic laboratory services for 
employees with infections, the infrequency with which employees have been 
Instructed about symptoms expected from illness due to agents in their 
laboratories, and the lack of consistency in placing individuals poten­
tially exposed to hazardous agents under surveillance all underscore the 
need for much clearer policies and instructions in these matters. Rela­
tively few respondents are maintaining a record of agents used each day; 
a much larger number of supervisors said such a log should be kept.
The same phenomenon is seen to a much less degree in sign-in, sign-out 
Policies.
Re c o m m e n d a t i o n
Responsibilities of the Office of Biosafety should be expanded to 
improve the surveillance of illness among CDC employees in order to 
relate illness to possible exposure while at work. Attached as Exhibit 3 
is a report of a study conducted by Dr. William J. Martone. In this study 







Employees' responses to questions concerning immunization policies 
and procedures were numerous.
The divergence of opinion regarding primary responsibility for 
insuring that individuals have received appropriate immunizations 
before entering specific buildings and laboratories indicates a rather 
striking fragmentation of such responsibilities. Most employees (58 
of 131, or 44%) said that they were primarily responsible for their 
own immunizations. Over half of the employees in the Bureau of 
Laboratories (69.2%) relied on the laboratory supervisor, but only 
15.4% of those in the Bureau of Epidemiology did so.
Support and Service Personnel-
Seventy percent of those responding to the questionnaire said they 
did not know which immunizations are needed for their job. Their 
opinions on where responsibility lay were quite diverse.
In response to the question, "Are you willing to work in hazardous 
areas if you have received proper shots?" 77% stated "yes." When 
asked, "If shots are not available to protect you, are you willing 
to work under these conditions?", 77% said "no." During interviews 
several employees in this group said that if they were "vaccinated," 
they were safe. This opinion emphasizes a need for better education 
about the value of certain immunizations.
Laboratory Bench Workers-
Of the 200 people who responded, 26% said they did not have 
preexposure serum on file*. Many respondents did not know if their 
immunizations were current.
Supervisors-
When asked the question, "Who is primarily responsible for ensuring 















Many individuals do not know what immunizations they should be 
given nor where records should be maintained.
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Four components are basically responsible for the present immunization 
system at CDC: The Office of Biosafety, CDC Clinic, Computer Systems 
Office, and user organizations.
The Office of Biosafety is responsible for the overall administration 
of the immunization program by: (1) periodically surveying the user 
organizations to ascertain that their organizational and/or individual 
immunization requirements correctly reflect the possibility of exDosure to 
infection, (2) requesting and distributing a monthly list of personnel due 
immunizations to each user organization, (3) correcting or changing the 
system as necessitated by errors or revised immunization requirements.
The Clinic is responsible for (1) scheduling immunizations when 
contacted by the user organization, (2) administering immunizations, (3) 
keeping a record of immunizations in the individual's medical folder, (4) 
sending a coded notification to the Computer Systems Office that the 
immunization was given, and (5) notifying the Office of Biosafety of any 
aPparent errors in the system or data.
The Computer Services Office is responsible for (1) producing reports 
0n immunization as requested by the Office of Biosafety and (2) providing 
Programming services for revising the immunization system— again as 
requested by the Office of Biosafety.
The user organization is responsible for (1) contacting the Clinic and 
asking that immunizations be scheduled when the monthly report of personnel 
due immunizations is received, (2) notifying organization personnel when to 
report to Clinic for immunization, (3) notifying the Biosafety Office of 
any changes or corrections needed in data in the system.
These lists of responsibilities indicate the system can break down in 
numerous places. In fact, the system appears to have broken down in so 
®any places that personnel have very little confidence in its ability to 
Provide accurate data on immunizations. This lack of confidence is 
evidenced by the fact that most of the organizations contacted have some 
sort of manual system upon which they rely for immunization data. Even so 
many employees neither know what immunizations they have had nor what 
immunizations they need.
The failure of the computerized immunization system seems to lie in 
the fact that there are no written descriptions of the system, no written 
instructions for operating it, and no written designations of 
responsibilities. Consequently, persons involved in the operation of the 
system do not know their responsibilities nor the responsibilities of 
Persons in other parts of the system. With this complete lack of 
understanding, the system is likely to break down unnoticed at any time and 
stay broken down for any length of time.
18
Examples of system breakdown:
1. The Office of Biosafety from 1973 to 1977 did not review 
immunization requirements.
2. Monthly lists of personnel due to receive immunizations were not 
distributed for several months in 1976 because the Office of 
Biosafety employee who usually sent out the lists was on sick 
leave. No one else in the Office of Biosafety was trained to do 
this job, and no one in the Office was aware that the lists had 
not been distributed.
3. New Clinic personnel were not instructed by their predecessors on 
the need to make EDP entries for immunizations, so immunizations 
were not recorded on the computer.
4. Clinic Personnel did not make correct entries on EDP forms, so 
immunizations were not recorded on the computer.
5. User organizations have not attempted to correct the computer data 
because of lack of knowledge about the system. They simply 
discard the computer immunization data and use their manual 
system.
6. No description of the Immunization System has been prepared by the 
Computer Systems Office or the Office of Biosafety.
7. Computer lists have been distributed with no instructions 
concerning their disposition.
8. Computer lists containing data that users could not interpret have 
been distributed.
£E£QMMENDATI0NS
Despite the shortcomings of the present computer-controlled 
immunization system, the concept of computer control is valid for this use. 
Such a system, however, must have clearly written instructions and 
responsibilities must be clearly designated. All employees should be able 
to read the reports with ease. The reports should not contain unexplained 
codes and meaningless dates. Ideally, the system should annually generate 
a wallet-sized card showing current immunizations for each CDC employee. 
Finally, the system must be kept current and accurate at all times to 
overcome the justifiable lack of confidence that has been built up by most 
user organizations.
An ad hoc committee composed of Bob Falter, Clinic; Kathy McCormack, 
Office of Biosafety; Forrest Thornton, Computer Systems Office; and Les 
Sohaum, Engineering Services Office, is working on modifying the 
Immunization System to provide a more reliable system. r
1
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Initial steps to be taken include:
1. Revising report schedules to reduce data lag and resultant 
redundant information.
2. Setting up reports to run automatically so that reports will be 
put out even if the coordinator is absent.
3. Revising report format as follows to make it more readable:
a. Making titles more descriptive of report content.
b. Numbering pages of reports.
c. Printing dates on all reports.
d. Deleting dummy code dates on reports distributed to user 
organization.
4. Having the computer print instructions for disposition of reports 
on the reports.
5. Preparing a complete system description with flow charts showing 
responsibilities for each component and distributing to all 
persons having system responsibilities.
6. Assigning immunization responsibility for user organizations at 
Division or Branch level to minimize contact points and to fix 
responsibility.
These changes, together with close attention to the ongoing 
operational aspects of the systems should result in a more reliable, 
accurate, and manageable Immunization system. The system should be 
reviewed periodically by the Biohazards Control Committee and the Office of 
®iosafety.
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In preliminary interviews with several employees, deficiencies in the 
laboratory safety training offered at CDC became evident. This problem 
Was explored further through the questionnaires.
Nonlaboratory personnel-
0f the 15 nonlaboratory and nonlaboratory support personnel who 
on occasion do laboratory work, a number appear not to have re­
ceived appropriate training in biosafety. As previously mentioned, 
six did not know if written protocols existed for routine labora­
tory procedures and nine did not know if written protocols were 
included in safety procedures. Forty percent did not know if they 
adhered to laboratory safety procedures, and 13% specifically claimed 
not to adhere to laboratory safety procedures. In no instance 
had knowledge of biosafety been derived from a CDC sponsored course, 
14 of 15 (93%) received most of their training on the job or before 
joining CDC. Only 2 of the 15 received specific instructions on 
symptoms to be expected from an illness due to agents used in their 
laboratory; 12 of the 15 claimed to know what symptoms to expect on 
the basis of prior professional training.
Service and Support personnel-
Thirty-six percent stated that they had not received safety 
orientation in their present job. Orientation, when given, was by:
V I . TRAINING
PROBLEM
# %
Experienced worker 23 20
Supervisor 65 56
Safety Office 20 17
Classroom instruction 8 7
This group of respondents made two comments:
a) Persons working in high risk areas should be given special training.
b) All service personnel should be trained and oriented about hazardous 
areas.
Laboratory Bench Workers-
Half of this group responded that they received training during 








When asked the question, "Have you received any subsequent safety 
training?", 203 (69%) said "yes" and 93 (31%) said "no." The 203 said they 
received the subsequent training as follows: 17%, from coworkers; 20%, 
supervisor; 14%, Office of Biosafety; 36%, films; and 13%, structured course. 
When answers to this question are compared with answers to the previous 
question, it becomes obvious that after the first month the Office of 
Biosafety, films and structured courses increase as sources of additional 
safety training and coworkers and supervisors decrease as sources.
In response to the question, "Do you believe that the safety 
training you have received has been adequate?", 173 (61%) said "yes" 
and 110 (39%) said "no." This points up a need for (1) more and 
better safety training and (2) reinforced safety training to assure 
laboratorians that they are in fact adequately trained or more 
probably, some mixture of both categories of training with emphasis 
on better safety training.
Twenty-two respondents stated that safety training was substandard. 
Supervisors-
Supervisors indicated on-the-job training to be their primary 
source of biosafety knowledge. This source became more important 
as the length of time at CDC and length of time on the present job at 
CDC increased. In regard to the latter the figures are: those 
employed less than 1 year, 40%; 1 to 5 years, 48%; and more than 5 
years, 72%. Almost all supervisors responded on the questionnaire 
that they thought they were adequately trained in biosafety.
No training source in biosafety is readily available outside CDC, 
so most employees obtain such knowledge after coming on duty at CDC. 
Special efforts need to be directed towards biosafety training for 
supervisors of nonmicrobiology laboratories. Supervisors strongly 
reaffirmed their primary responsibility for training members of their 
laboratory staffs in biosafety, but the data suggest that their 
subordinates do not believe they are fulfilling this role.
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. All new employees should receive safety training appropriate to their 
jobs as a part of their initial orientation within the first month.
After completing training, the employee should sign a statement to that 
effect, and it should be placed in his or her personnel file.
If reassignment results in a significant change in duties, recommenda­
tion No. 1 should again apply.
C. The immediate first-line supervisor should be responsible for seeing
that employees receive the training described in recommendations 1 and 2.
A segment of every lab training course should be devoted to safety 
training. This segment should appear in the course schedule.
One person or committee should coordinate all safety training, for 
CDC employees, trainees, and students.
A continuing program of safety education and training should be 
developed.
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Generally, this office develops and implements a broad program 
designed to protect CDC employees and the public from a variety of hazards. 
Some of the specific official functional areas are: physical security 
(guards); fire safety; supervision and enforcement of parking regulations; 
driver's licenses, building passes, and I.D. cards; radiation safety; 
computer security; biological and chemical safety in laboratories; safety 
training (in-house and extramural); regulation of importation and shipment 
of etiologic agents; disposal of hazardous wastes (chemical, biological, 
and radiological); administering the immunization program; processing 
claims for and against the government; and accident investigation. 
Professional staff members, and particularly the Director, serve as members 
of CDC, as well as national and international, committees related to 
several aspects of safety, including recombinant DNA research, chemical 
carcinogens, and design of containment facilities for hazardous agents.
The Director also serves as CDC Veterinary Public Health Coordinator and as 
coeditor of the monthly publicaion Veterinary Public Health Notes.
In addition, because of CDC's position as the recognized leader in 
public health research and service, the Office of Biosafety receives 
numerous requests for information and consultation. They are also asked to 
visit and consult with clinical laboratories, hospitals, universities, and 
other government institutions. This is especially true with respect to 
procedures for safe handling and disposal of hazardous materials and design 
and operation of special containment facilities for hazardous biological 
agents.
The staff of the Office of Biosafety now includes three professionals, 
including the Director (whose time is almost entirely devoted to 
administrative and consultative duties), two technicians, and a supporting 
staff including one secretary, one part-time clerk, one staff assistant, 
and 10 guards. One professional and one technician, because of their many 
other duties, do not routinely work in areas of laboratory safety. The 
remaining professional and technician spend most of their time on 
laboratory safety-related projects.
Opinions expressed in interviews, comments, and responses to 
questionnaires indicate mixed attitudes toward the role and effectiveness 
of the Office of Biosafety. Overall, only about half of the respondents 
believed the Office of Biosafety to be responsive to their needs. 
Supervisors and laboratorians working with more hazardous agents were more 
likely than others to consult with the Office of Biosafety. A fairly high 
Percentage of respondents said they believed the Office of Biosafety should 
have more authority to enforce safety regulations. Respondents seemed to 
feel that the Office of Biosafety is not visible enough in its daily 
contact with laboratories, and this is recognized to be at least partially 
due to the small staff.
VII. OFFICE OF BIOSAFETY
24
The consensus of the responses and observations leads to the following 
conclusions:
1. CDC employees do not clearly understand the duties and role of the 
Office of Biosafety.
2. The Office of Biosafety needs to be more visible and more 
responsive to the needs of laboratorians. (These needs may 
require definition, and they can best be defined by personal 
contact of safety personnel with laboratorians).
3. The duties and responsibilities of the Office of Biosafety are 
excessive for the size of the staff.
M i q m m e n d a t i o n s
A. The Office of Biosafety should be reorganized and expanded. The 
present Office of Biosafety is a misnomer because all CDC safety 
responsibilities are now centered there, such as plant security, 
parking lot control, and chemical and radiological safety. We 
recommend that an office be established with responsibility solely for 
biosafety, and that other functions not related to biosafety be 
assigned to a separate office.
B. The Director, CDC, should reaffirm in writing the limits of authority 
and responsibilities of the Office of Biosafety.
C. A Biohazard Control Committee composed of individuals who are 
technically knowledgeable about biosafety should be organized to 
advise and support the Biosafety Officer.
Resources should be made available for research, for testing, and for 
development of biosafety equipment, facilities, and procedures. This 
is urgent if CDC is to be a center of excellence in regard to 
biosafety.
E* The following additional staff should be added immediately to the 
Office of Biosafety:
1. A technician (safety specialist)
2. A microbiologist knowledgable about biohazard control
3. An industrial hygienist
4. A medical epidemiologist
5. One additional full-time clerk-typist
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CPC Personnel Interviewed Regarding Biohazards
.Virology Division
Lorene H. Adams 
Marja H. Barron 
Sally P. Bauer 
Patricia Bingham 
Renee A. Black 
Denise R. Brown 
Helen L. Casey 
Roy W. Chamberlain 
Avis L . Cherry 
Nancy J . Cox 
Kathryn H. Crane 
Theresa Cromeans 
Walter R. Dowdle 
Helen M. Engelman
Joseph Esposito 
Rudolph G . Falcone 
Paul M. Feorino 
fiert K. Fiedler 
**ary R. Flemister 
Judith C. Galphin 
Jared J . Gardner 
George W. Gary, Jr. 
Anna D. Hall 
Bette A. Hall 
Alyne K. Harrison 
MUford H. Hatch 
Kenneth L. Herrmann 
John T. Heyward 
John Hierholzer 
Susan K. Hollingshead 
®rian P. Holloway 
Margaret L. Hopping 
D°rreth D. Humphrey 
Harriet D. Hutchinson 
Karl M. Johnson 
Harold S. Kaye 
Alan P. Kendal 
James V. Lange 
Beverly C. Lawrence 
fester J. Lewis 
Helen S. Lindsey 
George E. Marchetti 
^ary Lane Martin 
°seph E. McDade
Donna L. Miller 
Shannon H. Mitchell 
Frederick A. Murphy 
James H. Nakano 
Verne F. Newhouse 
Gary R. Noble 
Baldev K. Nottay 
John F. Obijeski 
Erskine L. Palmer 
Joanne L. Patton 
Rosemarie B. Petrucci 
Martha A. Redus 
Luna F. Roumillat 
Karen C. Sanderlin 
Donna R. Sasso 
John W. Scott 
Charles C. Shepard 
Steven L. Shore 
Marianne D. Stapp 
John A. Stewart 
Yvonne 0. Stone 
Wayne L. Thacker 
Martha L . Thieme 
James C. Trimier 
Rosalind M. Vanlandingham 
Laura L. Walker 
Donna T. Warfield 
Patricia A. Webb 
Bernice D. Werner 
Paul White 
Sylvia G. Whitfield 
Herta T. Wulff 
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Edwin H . George 
Henrietta E. Hall 
Diane Mundhenk 
Don J. Phillips 
Charles B. Reimer 
Dane W. Sanderlin 
Helen C. Snodgrass 
Ted Tzianabos 




Wilbert L. Cosby 
Harvey J. Johnson 
John L. Johnson 
Elmer Knox 








MEMORANDUM DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
t o  All Employees, Virology Division, BL d a t e :  March 14, 1977
F r ° m  : Director, Virology Division
subject: Laboratory Safety
The deaths of Mr. Flowers and Mr. Dubingon have been a blow to all of 
us. George Flowers was known for many years as a dependable, helpful 
and courteous fellow employee with a high sense of loyalty to the 
people in Building 7. Above all, to many of us he was a good friend. 
Robert Dubingon had not been here as long and was not as well known, 
but he had already established friendships with many in the building.
The cause of these two deaths was established last week as Rocky 
Mountain Spotted Fever. How or where they may have acquired this 
infection is not known. It may never be known, but there is little 
doubt that their deaths were work-related.
Today, Dr. Robinson is convening a task force to inspect microbiological 
contairment equipment and review the microbiological safety rules and 
practices in the Bureau of Laboratories. The task force will consist 
of representatives frcm the Scientific Services Division, Biological 
Products Division and Virology Division, Bureau of Laboratories; the 
Bacterial Diseases Division and Phoenix Laboratories, Bureau of 
Epidemiology; and the Engineering Services. Dr. John Forney,
General Bacteriology Consultant, Laboratory Training and Consultation 
Division, will serve as chairman. Dr. Feorino will represent the 
Virology Division. I urge each of you to cooperate fully with the task 
force in expediting their review.
I do not know what the final recommendations of the task force will be.
But we do not need to wait 2-3 weeks for the report in order to put into 
practice those things which we already know; that is, the basic ccmmon 
sense rules of safety:
1. No mouth pipetting of etiologic agents or sera (CDC Laboratory Safety 
Manual, page 75).
2. No eating, smoking, or drinking in the laboratory. In almost every 
Branch, clean areas have been designated for such activities.
3. Dispose of infectious materials promptly and correctly (CDC Laboratory 
Safety Manual, page 125).
4. Maintain biological safety cabinets clean and free frcm extraneous 
glassware and equipment.
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Because of our unblemished safety record over the past 17 years this 
building has been in operation, it is understandable that seme of us 
may have become somewhat casual in our attitudes towards safety. It 
has been brought home to us these past weeks in the saddest possible 
way that safety rules must be observed. We don't have the right to 
ignore the rules simply because they happen to be inconvenient or do 
not suit us. No one wants to be responsible for the illness of a fellow 
worker. To assure that this does not happen in the future, willful 
disregard of these common sense safety rules will be^eensidered grounds 
for disciplinary action. )
Walter R. Dowdle, Ph.D.
cc: Dr. Robinson
Me m o r a n d u m DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFAREPUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
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TO
DATE: March 24, 1977
Fr°m  Director, Virology Division, BL
Sl bJEc t : Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever Vaccination
Seme years ago, vaccination against Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF) 
was a requirement at the CDC for laboratory personnel working with, or 
exposed to, rickettsia. In the late 1960*s, the efficacy of the vaccine 
came under question. In several institutions, including the CDC, the 
emphasis gradually shifted from vaccination to more reliance on 
contairment facilities, restricted access to laboratories, and safety 
education. Generally quoted in support of this approach is the report 
by Dupont et al., Journal of Infectious Diseases 128:340, 1973» which 
showed that no protection was afforded by a primary course of the 
commercially (Lederle) available vaccine produced frcm infected yolk 
sacs. The subjects were challenged by a minimal number of guinea pig 
infectious doses. The egg-grown vaccine had been assumed to be effective 
for man based on data frcm protection studies in guinea pigs. The 
Dupont study represents the only controlled efficacy data available, 
although earlier data frcm field trials reported by Parker, American 
Journal of Tropical Medicine 21:369, 1941, suggested that vaccines 
produced frcm infected ticks tissue reduced the severity of naturally 
acquired RMSF and perhaps reduced the evidence of infection. Recently, 
data frcm the Walter Reed unit at Fort Detrick has shown that a course 
of the commercial vaccine reduced the severity of infections in rhesus 
monkeys. In short, then, protection frcm RMSF vaccine may be better 
than that demonstrated by Dupont et al., but it is likely no more than 
minimally effective. Because of the recent tragic events, the theoret­
ical advantages of the vaccine are being reconsidered by the CDC. The 
vaccine should not be viewed as a primary barrier to infection, but 
rather as a part of the total armamentarium for providing a possible 
extra margin of safety.
The RMSF vaccine manufactured by Lederle is a killed vaccine prepared 
frcm yolk sacs Infected with Rickettsia rickettsi. Mild, local 
reactions are reported as ccmmon. Persons who are allergic to eggs, 
that is, those who cannot eat eggs, should not take the vaccine. The 
primary series for immunization consists of three 1-ml doses 7 to 10 
days apart. A booster dose of 1 ml is reccmmended after 1 year and 
annually for a total of perhaps 3 years for those with heaviest 
exposure.
In accord with the CDC Laboratory Safety Manual (11-46), the vaccine 
will be required for the following: (a) persons who work directly with 
the disease agent In the laboratory, (b) persons who work In the same
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laboratory or who cane Into the roan while work is in progress, and 
(c) caretakers of infected animals. The vaccine is also being offered 
to all others in Building 7 who wish to receive it. It will not be 
required, but personnel should consider being vaccinated if their 
anticipated collaboration or equipment-sharing may take than into the 
rickettsial laboratories on "B" floor. These laboratories will be 
"off limits" to unvaccinated personnel.
Vaccinees will be asked to contribute pre- and post-vaccination bloods 
for evaluation of vaccine efficacy. If you are not among those for 
whan the vaccine is required, please let Mrs. Adams know if you wish to 
be vaccinated. Scheduling of personnel for prevaccination bloods and 
vaccination should begin next week.
Our records show the following information (if incorrect, contact 
Mrs. Lorene Adams, Ext. 357*0:
/_/ You have received the initial vaccine series and require a booster 
dose.
r_ / You have not previously received this vaccine and/will require a 
primary series of three doses. f '
/ \  i
Walter R. Dowdle, Ph.D.
Exhibit 2.3
Chief, Virology Division March 29, 1977
Chief, Technical Services Branch
Proposed Memorandum on RMSF Irnnunization
The following lists of names represent Technical Services Branch 
personnel that must receive RMSF irnnunization if your suggested 
memorandum is promulgated.

















There are two additional things that probably bear your consideration:
1. Laboratory coats cone fran your building to my laundry 
without being decontaminated. Should my laundry people 
receive RMSF irtitiunization?
2. My laboratory glassware transfer carts go into your
laboratories and cane back out and leave the building without 
being decontaminated. They pass through hallways, up and 
down elevators, and frequently are used by others of 
my people to go to other CDC laboratories. Do you see this 




cc: Dr. John Forney
Dr. John Richardson
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
: SEE BELOW DATE: May 9, 1977
Me m o r a n d u m
FMom ; Director, Offioe of Bioeafety
Director, Bureau of Laboratories
Su bject: Laboratory Safety
The Interim Report of the Task Force on Laboratory Safety requested 
that the attached excerpt of Laboratory Safety (pages II-3 through 
II-8) be distributed to all laboratory personnel. You are asked to 
evaluate your laboratory activities involving infectious agents in 
terms of the containment and operational procedures described on 
page II-6.
If deficiencies are noted in your containment capability or operational 
procedures, or if you need assistance in evaluating individual laboratory 




Bureau of Laboratories 








This section presents certain safety requirem ents for handling specific hazardous 
micro-organisms. These requirem ents derive from  judgm ent based on present knowledge; 
as further knowledge accum ulates and additional vaccines are developed, the 
requirem ents for some agents will change. The operational requirem ents are also based, in 
part, on  the existing facilities and resources at CDC. Similar precautions probably would 
not be feasible in many other institutions. Inform ation on required vaccines appears on 
pages II-11 through 11-64.
In the following tables on operational requirem ents for safety in the laboratory , no 
attem pt was made to  cover all m icrobiologic agents. All known micro-organisms that are 
not listed, however, can be handled safely in the laboratory w ithout special equipm ent, 
techniques, or im m unization o f  peisonnel.
Precautions are indicated only when they are clearly required for the safety o f  laboratory 
w orkers or others. O ptional or debatable items have been excluded; only those items 
deemed absolutely necessary for safety are presented. Thus, the following table of 
operational requirem ents presents only minimal safety criteria. For exam ple, it is highly 
desirable tha t all laboratories be under negative air pressure; however, the absence of 
negative air pressure in laboratories working w ith certain agents m ay no t be associated 
w ith an infection hazard.
Several additional operational principles and habits might be routine in laboratories even 
though they may not be required for safety w ith all micro-organisms. As a general 
principle, doors to  laboratories should be kept closed except for necessary entrances and 
exits, and visits by extraneous persons should be discouraged. Eating, drinking, or 
smoking in the laboratory is undesirable. Handwashing by laboratory personnel should be 
encouraged, and bulb pipetting, a good laboratory procedure, can be generally 
recom m ended. Disinfection o f  work surfaces after working w ith a disease agent is 
strongly recom m ended as a routine measure. All o f these general recom m endations are 
desirable, even if they are not specifically needed for the safe handling o f certain agents.
The following index table (Table 1) lists hazardous micro-organisms w ithin the basic 
categories o f Bacteria, Parasites, Viruses (including R ickettsia and Bedsonia), and Fungi. 
Each agent has been given a num ber and an alphabetic letter th a t identifies its 
“ Precaution Category” (PC). The letter appears im m ediately to  the right o f  the name o f  
the agent. Table 2, the operational requirem ents table, contains precaution categories in 
alphabetic order ; the specific requirem ents for handling a particular agent are indicated 
by “+” entries under the various colum ns. Micro-organisms that require the same set o f 
precautions are grouped w ithin the same precaution category and, to  conserve space, are 
identified by their code numbers.
Com m ents on each colum n heading in Table 2 follow the table.
11-3
LAB SAFETY
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
Table 1
34
IN D EX  TO OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
O ID * * BACTERIA . * * * O ID *4 BACTERIA P C ***
1 Actinobacillus-all species D 23 Mycobacteria-all other species D
(except A. mallei) 24 Mycoplasma-all species D
2 Actinobacillus mallei BB 25 Neisseria gonorrhoeae and D
3 Antinomyces-all species D N. imnmgitidis
4 Aeromonas salmonicida D 26 Pasteurella pestis, * AA
5 Arizona arizonae-a\\ D tularensis, * multocida
serotypes (Type B)
6 Bacillus anthracis * AA 27 Pasteurella-all other D
7 Bartonella-all species N species
8 Bordetella-all species D 28 Pseudomonas pseudomallei BB
9 Brucella-all species BB 29 Salmonella typhi* G
10 Clostridium botulinum * AA 30 Salmonella-all other D
11 Clostridium tetani* G species
12 Clostridia-other species D 31 Shigella-all species D
13 Corynebacterium diphtheriae * G 32 Sphaerophorus necrophorus D
14 Corynebacteria-other species A 33 Staphylococcus aureus D
15 Erysipelothrix insidiosa D 34 Streptobacillus moniliformis D
16 Haemophilus ducreyi, D 35 Streptococcus pneumoniae D
H. gallinarum 36 Streptococcus agalactiae D
H. influenzae S. equi, S. equisimilis
17 Herellea vaginicola A S. pyogenes of Lancefield's
18 Klebsiella-all species A Groups A, B, C, G
19 Leptospira-all species D 37 Treponema pallidum. D
20 Listeria-all species D pertenue, carateum
21 Mima polymorpha A 38 Vibrio comma * K
22 Mycobacterium avium, bovis. CC 39 Vibrio fetus D
johnei, tuberculosis 40 Yersinia enterocolitica D
O ID * * PARASITES P C ***
41 Echinococcus granulosus c
42 Echinococcus multilocularis c
43 Leishmania braziliensis N
44 Leishmania donovanii N
45 Leishmania mexicana N
46 Leishmania tropica N
47 Naegleria gruberi L
48 Plasmodium falciparum F
49 Plasmodium malariae F
50 Plasmodium ovale F
51 Plasmodium vivax F
O ID ** PARASITES P C ***
52 Pneumocystis carinii T
53 Shistosoma haematobium H
54 Shistosoma japonicum H
55 Shistosoma mansoni H
56 Taenia solium B
57 Toxoplasma gondii T
58 Trypanosoma cruzi N
59 Trypanosoma gambiense D
60 Trypanosoma rangeli B
61 Trypanosoma rhodesiense D
II-4
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R ICKETTSIA, BEDSONIA P C *** O ID ** R ICKETTSIA , BEDSONIA PC **
Adenoviruses-all types •I 85 Rabies-Street virus* S
Arboviruses-general Y 86 Reoviruses 1
B. virus CC 87 Respiratory syncytial virus J
Coxsackie A & B-all types J 88 Rhinovirus 1
Cytomegalovirus 1 89 Rickettsia rickettsii* DD
Echoviruses-all types 1 90 Rubella * K
Encephalomyocarditis virus L 91 Simian viruses, (except B J
Hepatitis infectious & sttium 1 virus and Marburg)
Herpesviruses except B L 92 Smallpox virus DD
Infectious bronchitis­ L Major and Minor *
like virus 93 Tacaribe group viruses EE
Influenza virus-all types * 1 except Tamiami
K virus P 94 Tamiami virus L
Langat R 95 Tick-borne viral encepha­ X
Lassa virus EE litis: (Russian-Spring-
Marburg virus EE Summer-Encephalitis * and
Measles virus * K all other viruses of
Murine viruses, including E complex except Langat)
ectromelia, LCM, murine 96 Vaccinia * P
hepatitis, etc. 97 Varicella J
Mumps virus * K 98 Venezuelan encephalitis Y
Newcastle Disease virus 1 virus-exotic strains
Polio viruses * M 99 VEE-domestic and vaccine W
Psittacosis, LGV U strains
Q Fever,* R. prowazeki*, and Z 100 Vesicular stomatis & other V
all other rickettsia rhabdoviruses
except R. rickettsii 101 Yellow Fever * X
Rabies-Fixed & attenuated I
O ID ** FUNGI P C ***
102 Blastomyces dermatididis O
103 Cryptococcus neoformans O
104 Paracoccidioides O
105 Histoplasma capsulatum Q
106 Coccidioides immitis Q
107 Sporothrix schenckii O
•Vaccines for these agents are described 
on pages 11-13 through 11-64.
• * O ID  “  Organism Identification Number 
* * * P C  = Precaution Category
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Precaution Category -  The explanation is given on page 11- 6 .
Geographic Isolation -  The action o f isolating in a separate room or 
building in which no other work is concurrently conducted. A ventilating 
system to the room  that prevents recirculation of air is implied. Exhaust 
air may be passed though High Efficiency Particulate Air (HF.PA) filters or 
incinerated. l o r  extrem ely hazardous agcnls, an air lock should also be 
used.
Controlled Access -  The exclusion of extraneous persons from areas 
where certain agents are being handled. Such control decreases the 
probability o f distractions resulting in accidents and limits the num ber of 
exposed individuals should an accident occur.
The degree to  which access is limited depends upon the risk associated 
with being in the area: the greater the hazard, the more restrictive the 
entrance requirem ents.
Corridors are the least hazardous o f any locations in restricted laboratory 
areas. Areas in which the w ork is associated with a greater degree of risk 
are marked by signs reading “Caution, do not enter w ithout current 
itimiiiiii/n11<>n ii(iiiiiui (mime ill iliviiM'}" m " ( ‘millon, lnlcclititm H|trnU, 
do not rn lf  i wit In ml HUltim i/nllon Itom  (name ol investigator) " Theje 
signs arc posted only while the risk is present.
Entrance to  some areas should be restricted to  the staff assigned to  it. 
Access to areas in which very hazardous agents are being used should be 
controlled with locks and keys. No-access areas should be posted with 
signs reading “Warning: Highly Infectious Material: Keep O u t."  In 
tem porary situations, such as following an accident, a large sign with 
bright red printing reading “ Danger: DO NOT ENTER: Contam inated 
Areas” is posted. Areas posted with either o f these signs are o ff limits to 
all personnel except the investigator who posted the sign. One should not 
pass these signs for any  reason, not even to  fight fire.
Questions about the location of areas of restricted access, the hazards in 
the areas and the risk o f  infection, the times when restricted areas can be 
visited, or the im m unizations required for access should be directed to  the 
Biohazards Control Officer.
Negative Air Pressure -  Ideally, the air pressure in all laboratories should 
be negative in relation to  the pressure in surrounding corridors, thus 
helping to  prevent agents from leaving the w ork area. When negative 
pressure is required, as shown in Table 2, it is essential for safety. Even 
when cultures are m anipulated under hoods, negative pressure in the 
general lab area in relation to  that in surrounding corridors is still highly 
desirable. In addition, doors to all laboratories should be closed except for 
necessary entrances and exits.
Hood and Cabinets -  These include protected  w ork areas such as the CDC 











Disinfections — Standard m ethods suitable for disinfection o f work 
surfaces, entire work area, and material before leaving w ork area have not 
been presented. Disinfection should routinely take place when work with 
agents is com pleted, and each laboratory should be cleaned, w ork surfaces 
decontam inated, and all contam inated material either covered in discard 
pans or autoclaved at the end o f the work day. The Biohazards Control 
Officer should be contacted  for specific instructions.
Bulb Pipetting -  This heading is self-explanatory.
Protective Equipm ent
Gloves, including gloves on cabinet or hood ports, should be worn 
whenever one is handling organisms which call for this precaution. Gloves 
prevent the direct invasion o f  micro-organisms through intact skin and 
greatly reduce the hazards o f indirect spread.
Masks should be worn to protect against the aerosol spread o f  certain 
organisms. Such masks should be worn except when the work is done in: 
a) a sealed cabinet in rooms with isolated ventilation systems with exhaust 
contro l, or b) effective immunizing agents have been given to all who 
might be exposed. High efficiency, disposable surgical masks are recom­
m ended; they are capable o f reducing by 2 logs the num ber o f airborne 
micro-organisms that are inhaled. Special respirators or supplied air 
equipm ent may have essentially com plete respiratory protection.
O ther Special Clothing or Guards -  Face masks or shields, caps, safety 
gloves, booties, or even com plete changes o f clothing may be indicated for 
aerosol work w ith certain very hazardous agents. No attem pt has been 
made to  specify which special equipm ent may be needed for which special 
agents. The Biohazards Control Officer should be consulted for advice and 
guidance.
Special Precautions with Work Involving Insects and Animals -  These 
precautions have been stipulated for hazardous agents that might be 
capable o f spread to  hum ans through insects and animal vectors. 
C ontainm ent facilities should be secure before w ork is begun. The 
excretions and secretions o f infected animals and insects may be infectious 
to  hum ans, and personnel who must come in contact w ith them  should 
routinely use special protective equipm ent. In some instances, discharges 
are capable o f  establishing disease in nature. These wastes must be 
decontam inated before they are released from the facility.
Special Aerosol Precautions -  Centrifuges, blenders, and other equipment 
capable o f  creating aerosols should be operated in separate “isolation” 
room s or hoods. Special care should be taken in loading centrifuges to  
avoid accidental breakage during operation. Safety equipm ent to prevent 
the form ation o f aerosols is available and should be used. The Biohazards 
Control Officer should be consulted for further inform ation.
Im m unization Available and Required — Im m unization is generally 
recommended for all diseases against which effective, safe, and licensed 
vaccines have been developed. However, there are no vaccines against 
many highly virulent organisms, and some vaccines for such agents are 
investigational and w ithout clear docum entation o f  efficacy in humans. 
Nonetheless, in certain circumstances, the seriousness o f the disease and 
the absence o f  o ther effective therapy may dicatate their use.
LAB SAFETY
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 
Public Health Service 
Center for Disease Control 
Atlanta, Georgia 30333
May 9, 1977
CDC GENERAL MEMORANDUM NO. 77-5
LABELING OF EQUIPMENT TO BE REMOVED FROM A LABORATORY OR SERVICED 
IN THE LABORATORY
To assure that all equipment to be removed from a laboratory is free 
from dangerous chemicals or infectious organisms, the laboratory 
supervisor is responsible for Form CDC 0.593 being completed and 
affixed to the equipment. This applies to all equipment that is to 
be removed from the laboratory for maintenance, repair, transfer, 
surplus, or any other purpose. Also, equipment that must be 
serviced on site in the laboratory must bear the same label. The 
form will be removed from the equipment at the time of return to the 
laboratory or at the time servicing on site is completed.
If electronic or other specialized complex equipment must be 
decontaminated by extraordinary methods before repairs, maintenance, 
or other disposition can be made, the Office of Biosafety 
(telephone extension 3883) should be contacted for assistance or 
advice.
Form CDC 0.593 (a self-adhesive form) is illustrated on the reverse 
of this page. Copies of the form are available:
(1) at each of the maintenance and repair shops
(2) by telephone request to Engineering Services Office, 
extension 3216
(3) from the Office of Biosafety, extension 3883
(4) from the collateral duty safety inspector for facilities 
other than at the Clifton Road facility
This memorandum supersedes CDC General Memorandum No. 73-8, Labeling 
of Equipment Sent for Maintenance/Repairs.
James D. Bloom 
Executive Officer
DISTRIBUTION: Mailing List No. 1, Codes 2 and 3
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To Director, Office of Biosafety d a t e :  May 17, 1977
f*o m : Chief, Technical Services Branch
SIjbJEc t : Decontamination of Potentially Infectious 
Glassware and Related Items
Now that I have had the hoses removed from all of the central auto­
clave rooms at the Clifton Road facility, it is necessary to re­
think, change, and reissue the decontamination protocols.
Prior to the removal of the hoses it was possible to add water to 
discard pans in the autoclave rooms just before autoclaving. Since 
this is no longer possible, it will be necessary to add some aqueous 
solution to the discard pans in the laboratories before transporting 
them to the central autoclave rooms.
My thinking relative to this procedural change is as follows:
a. In those instances where it has always been the practice for 
laboratorians to autoclave glassware and related items that 
they produce, and the Laboratory Services Section (LSS) per­
sonnel only picked up the already autoclaved material and 
returned it to the LSS washroom area, no changes in protocol 
are necessary. This is only true if all such laboratorians 
realize the importance of, and in fact do, add approximately 
one inch of some aqueous solution to the discard pans prior to 
autoclaving. Such solutions can be water, or a liquid germi­
cide, or for that matter, since it is their own business, any 
liquid that will volatilize during the initial stage of auto­
claving and drive the air up and out of discard pans.
b. In those instances where it has in the past been the practice 
of LSS personnel to add water to discard pans that do not con­
tain any liquid, and then autoclave the pans and return them 
to the LSS washroom area, it will now be necessary for labor­
atorians to add some liquid to the pans prior to delivering 
them to the central autoclave rooms.
c . The LSS personnel will continue, as in the past, to autoclave 
the discard pans and return them to the LSS washroom.
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Director, Office of Biosafety 2
d. I personally believe that unless it is logistically impractical 
to purchase, stock, and supply laboratories with the germicide 
of choice against the organism with which they work, that they 
should be so supplied.
e. Further, the new protocol should make a particular point of 
stating that only approximately one inch of liquid be placed in 
pans so that during transport and handling prior to autoclaving 
the chance of it slopping out of the pans will be minimized.
f. Lastly, the point should be equally, strongly made that the 
transportation of discard pans from the laboratory to the central 
autoclave room remains the responsibility of the laboratorians.
Last Friday, May 13, 1977, I instructed that the hoses be removed, and 
by the end of the working day all had been. I further contacted a 
representative of each Bureau of Laboratories Division plus a Bureau 
of Epidemiology representative and requested that they inform all 
laboratorians in their respective organizations that the hoses were 
being taken out of the central decontamination autoclave rooms and that 
it has thus become the responsibility of laboratorians to add liquid to 
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T° : Bureau Director and d a t e ?  June 22, 1977
Branch Chief
f*o m  US PHS Outpatient Clinic
Atlanta, Georgia
SijB JE ct: Services provided by PHS Clinic for CDC employees
(1) Physical Examinations for Employees forty and over.
This exam is offered to employees every two years. The 
examination includes CXR, EKG, U/A, VDRL, CBC, SMA 12.
Other types of physicals performed include PHS annual and 
separation, WHO, fit-for-duty, pre-employment, and annual 
retired military.
(2) On the job injury and illness.
We request that supervisors call the clinic before sending 
employees. This allows our staff to prepare for emergencies 
and to give appointments to non-emergencies. A two way memo 
should be sent with employees seen for on the job illnesses. 
Forms 304 and CA-16 should be sent with injured employees.
(3) Blood Pressure Screening.
(4) Allergy Shots.
Offered twice a week. Employees are asked to bring instructions 
on how injections are to be administered. The first injection 
should be given by employee's private physician.
(5) Immunizations and boosters required by CDC laboratories.
(6) Medical records on employees are sent to private physicians
at the employee's request. A release form must be signed before 
records are sent out. Please give 2 weeks notice on requests 
for medical records.
(7) Medications are provided for on the job illnesses and injuries 
when indicated. Medication is also provided to employees who 
forget to take needed medications.
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(8) When employees are referred from the clinic to consultants, 
either BEC or the patient is responsible for the bill. The 
clinic pays the bills for PHS officers.
(9) The clinic functions on an appointment basis; however, 
emergencies are given priority over scheduled clinic operations. 
Drop-ins are handled as soon as scheduling permits.
CLINIC SCHEDULE
TIME DAY
Allergy Shots 10 AM Mon.
Fri.
Yellow Fever Shots 10 AM Tues.
BP Screening 1 PM Weds.
Fri.
If you have questions concerning clinic procedures, don't 
hesitate to call: 3385 - 3386.
Lonnie C. Jenkiiis, M.D. 
Director
. B. A. 
Deputy Director
MEMORANDUM DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
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CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
TO
All Course Coordinators and Branch Chiefs d a t e :  August 2, 1977 
Laboratory Training and Consultation Division
. Director, Laboratory Training and Consultation Division
O bject: Briefing of Students on Laboratory Safety
The responsibility for laboratory safety for students attending CDC 
courses rests with the course coordinators. Only the course coordinator 
is fully aware of the day-to-day activities in the training laboratory and 
the potential hazards of these activities. It is the coordinator's 
responsibility to instruct the students in the proper safety practices 
pertinent to their training while at CDC and to make certain that these 
instructions are followed. To facilitate this instruction, each course 
schedule must contain a portion of time specifically designated and 
identified as being devoted to the instruction of students on the subject of 
laboratory safety. It is the Branch Chief's responsibility to assure that 
instructions are given,
ihn H. Krickel, Ed.D.
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All Employees, LT&C Division D A T E : ^ 197/
R°M : Director, LT&C Division, BL
SuBJEc t : Briefing of Incoming Personnel on Laboratory Safety
The primary responsibility for laboratory safety rests with the first 
line supervisor. Only he or she is fully aware of the day-to-day 
activities in his or her laboratory and the potential hazards of 
these activities. It Is the supervisor's responsibility to instruct 
the employee in the proper safety practices and to make certain that 
these instructions are followed. It is the Branch Chief's responsi­
bility to assure that instructions are given.
Overall responsibility for laboratory safety rests with the Office of 
the Director. It is my responsibility to make certain that each new 
person coming to work in the Division is informed of ongoing laboratory 
activities, restricted areas, vaccine requirements, rules prohibiting 
mouth pipetting, smoking, eating or drinking in the laboratory, and 
procedures for reporting illnesses.
Effective immediately, all new or transfer employees, visiting 
scientists, and trainees coming to work in the Division should be 
scheduled for a briefing in this office before undertaking their Branch 
assignments. Dr. Dan Sudia will conduct the briefing in my absence.
/John H. Krickel, Ed.D.
r
Identical memo was distributed to employees of each Division, Bureau of 
Laboratories.
Me m o r a n d u m DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
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TO
o a t e: August 10, 1977
pR°M Director, Office of Biosafety
O bject: Computer Print-out of Immunization Requirements for Personnel
With the assistance of the Task Force on Laboratory Safety and the CDC 
Clinic, revisions have been made to the immunization program. The 
attached print-out has been revised to include instructions. All immu­
nizations due should be scheduled with the Clinic on Form CDC 0.697 by 
the 1f>th day of the current month. Send the original of the form to 
the Clinic. Keep the second copy for your record. CDC 0.697 is avail­
able at the Office of Biosafety and after September 1 thru the Self- 
service Store, Building I*, Sub-basement Floor. A completed copy is 
attached as a sample for your information.
Other changes have been made in the program which will provide an 
individual immunization history and an individual immunization require­
ments listing for your personnel. These listings should come off the 
computer and be available for distribution within the next month.
Many people have input into the system; therefore, there are errors.
If your listing has errors or if you have other problems with the 
immunization program, please contact Kathy McCormack, Office of Biosafety, 
extension 3883.
I am attaching a listing of the Immunization Liaison Officers for your 
information. A meeting of all Immunization Liaison Officers has been 
scheduled for Monday, September 12 at 9:00 am in Classroom I. Please 
plan to attend.
/ /  John H. Richardson, D.V.M.
Attachments ^
IMMUNIZATION LIAISON OFFICERS
NAME_______________________BUREAU/dIVISION/STAFF SERVICE_____________________ BUILDING, ROOM NUMBER_______ EXTENSION
Kathy McCormack Office of Biosafety h 232 3883
Ellis Britt Engineering Services Office 11 110 3462
David Atkins Mail and Messenger Section 1 SB101+ 3208
Charlotte McClendon Materiel Management Branch Pfy 306 6719
Don Mackel Epidemiology, Bacterial Diseases Division 1 B370 3813
Myron G. Schultz Epidemiology, Parasitic Diseases Division 1 Si+21 3676
Henry M. Colvin Laboratories, Office of the Director 1 1106 3260
Raul H. Lopez-Correa Laboratories, San Juan Laboratories San Juan 809-781-
John A. Magill Laboratories, Bacteriology Division 1 1116 3663
Robert J. Ellis Laboratories, Biological Products Division 6 281+ 3356
Dayton T. Miller Laboratories, Clinical Chemistry Division 1 1202 3h3h
0. W. van Assendelft Laboratories, Hematology Division 1 1323 391U
Fay Neal
Laboratories
Laboratory Training and Consultation Division 
Office of the Director 6 291 3232
Lois Jennings Bacteriology Training Branch 1 2266 3646
Anne B. Wyatt Clinical Chemistry and Hematology Training Branch 6 292 3991
NAME bokeau/division/staff SERVICE BUILDING, ROOM NUMBER EXTENSION
Cynthia Hand 
Cynthia Hand 
China E. Christian 




Irving G. Kagan 
George R. Healy 
Shirley E. Maddison 




Sam M a m s
J. Roger Broderson 
Gerald C. Taylor 
Paul White/Lorene Adams
Diagnostic Immunology Training Branch 
Mycology Training Branch 
Parasitology Training Branch 
Venereal Disease Training Branch 
Virology Training Branch 
Laboratories










Scientific Services Division 
Data and Specimen Handling Activity
Technical Services Branch
Animal Breeding and Holding Section
Research Animal and Veterinary Pathology Section
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TO: USPHS Outpatient Clinic 
Building 1, Room G58
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE 
Public Health Service 
Center for Disease Control 
Atlanta, Georgia 30333
August 12, 1977
CDC GENERAL MEMORANDUM NO. 77-9
PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES FOR LABORATORY ACTIVITIES USING RABIES 
VIRUS
A. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a case of laboratory-associated rabies in a State health 
department laboratory technician was reported. Information on the 
case of rabies and important issues raised by the case are provided 
later in this memorandum. This case prompted a review of the pro­
cedures and practices in CDC laboratory activities which involve 
the use of rabies viruses.
B. SAFETY PRACTICES
As a result of this review, additional steps to reduce the hazard 
to personnel in rabies laboratories are recommended. Therefore, 
the following safety practices will be implemented immediately in 
CDC laboratories:
1. Any procedure which can produce virus aerosols will be performed 
in a biological safety cabinet or other physical containment 
system. The procedures would include homogenization, pellet 
resuspension, and sonication. Centrifugation, which can also 
generate aerosols, will be performed using sealed cups opened 
only in a biological safety cabinet or similar barrier system.
2. Activities involving work with large volumes of rabies virus, 
regardless of viral strain or titer, will be conducted in a 
biological safety cabinet or other physical containment system.
3. Protective gloves will be worn when performing any operation 
which might result in spillage of an infectious virus.
4. No person will work with rabies virus in the laboratory, even 
on a temporary basis, who has not demonstrated a seroconversion 
following immunization: a titer of 1:16 by the rapid fluor­
escent focus inhibition test or an equivalent titer by another 
test is considered as evidence of seroconversion.
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5. Antibody levels in persons working with rabies virus will be 
tested at least annually; revaccination will be given if the 
titer is below 1:16.
6. Earlier safety recommendations (1) regarding rabies laboratory 
hazards will remain valid.
C. INFORMATION ON REPORTED RABIES CASE
The information stated below on the reported rabies case was pub­
lished in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR),
Volume 26, No. 31, August 4, 1977, issue. The safety practices 
stated above also were published in that issue.
Followup on Rabies - New York: On June 3, a case of laboratory- 
associated rabies in a New York State Health Department laboratory 
technician was reported (2). The patient, a 32-year-old man, 
was hospitalized but is showing continued improvement. Motor 
function recovery has been particularly remarkable since mid- 
July; he is ambulatory but has occasional periods of agitation 
and spasticity. Although he remains aphasic, he is awake and 
appears to recognize family members. He has experienced mild 
recurring urinary tract infections; Escherichia coll has been 
isolated in each instance, and he has responded to therapy.
Serum antibody levels are being monitored at approximately 
2-week intervals; the antibody titer remains at approximately 
1:175,000—unchanged since it peaked at that level in mid-May.
Editorial Note: This case of laboratory-associated rabies, 
in which infection may have resulted from exposure to an 
aerosol, raises several questions regarding current laboratory 
practices. This is the second case of probable airborne infection 
with a laboratory-adapted strain of virus and the first case 
of rabies in an immunized individual with pre-existing serum 
neutralizing rabies antibodies.
Important issues raised by this rabies case are: 1) the risk 
of airborne exposure to rabies virus for laboratory personnel;
2) the protective value of serum neutralizing antibodies against 
airborne exposure; and 3) the human pathogenicity of labor- 
atory-adapted strains of rabies virus, both fixed and attenuated.
There is only limited information available on the risk of 
airborne exposure. Three earlier human cases have been reported,
2 following exposure in bat caves and 1 resulting from exposure 
to an aerosol generated by a tissue homogenizer (3). These 
cases and the limited data on airborne infection in animals (4) 





Serum neutralizing antibody is well documented as a conventional 
protective measure against subsequent challenge by inoculation 
or bite exposure. The relationship between serum neutralizing 
antibody levels and protection against aerosol exposure is not 
known.
It is known that fixed virus strains (challenge virus standard 
and production virus) are pathogenic for man. The pathogeni­
city of attenuated vaccine strains varies with the site of 
inoculation, strain of virus, and species exposed. Attenuated 
strains which have been further manipulated, as by tissue culture 
or animal passage, are of unknown virulence and must be con­
sidered pathogenic until proven otherwise.
1. MMWR 21:179, 1972
2. MMWR 26:183, 1977
3. MMWR 26:113-114, 1972
4. Winkler WG, Baker EF, Hopkins CC: An outbreak of non-bite 
transmitted rabies in a laboratory animal colony. AM J Epidemiol 
95:267-277, 1972
References
William H. Foege, M.D.
Assistant Surgeon General 
Director, Center for Disease Control
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FR01* : Director,Scientific Services Division 
s*j8JEc t: Division Biosafety Rules
It is important that you be knowledgeable about biosafety rules which 
apply to all Division personnel, plus specific biosafety rules which 
apply to certain positions in the Division.
All new Division employees will receive orientation concerning these 
rules prior to beginning work. Orientation will begin in the Division 
Director's Office and proceed to specific orientation by the Immediate 
Supervisor. Current employees must familiarize themselves with the bio­
safety rules listed in this memorandum and its attachment.
Scientific Services Division (SSD) Branch Chiefs are asked to obtain the 
signature of each employee to indicate that the employee has received 
orientation on the biosafety rules in effect for SSD employees.
General Biosafety Rules to be observed by all Division employees:
1. Hazard warning signs indicate areas of general and specific risk. 
Every employee will obey these signs at all times. Under no cir­
cumstances will any employee enter a restricted area without 
special clearance from the Laboratory Supervisor of the area.
2. SSD personnel are not permitted to eat, drink, or smoke in any 
CDC laboratory.
3. Every employee is responsible for observing proper safety practices 
such as the wearing of protective clothing, showering, and hand 
washing. Requirements for protective clothing, if required, will 
be stated in the Specific Biosafety Rules (attached).
In addition to the above general rules all Division employees will have a 
serum specimen on file in the Serum Bank Section and will receive designated 
immunizations prior to beginning specific work programs.
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All personnel are encouraged to bring to the attention of their Immediate 
Supervisor any observed breaches of CDC biosafety rules.
I have read the General and Specific Biosafety Rules that pertain to my 
Job, have reviewed them with my Immediate Supervisor and understand them.
Also, my Immediate Supervisor has discussed with me the portions of the 
CDC safety manual, "Lab Safety at the Center for Disease Control" that 







DATA AND SPECIMEN HANDLING ACTIVITY (DASH)
SPECIFIC BIOSAFETY RULES
October 3, 1977
DASH is an Activity in the Office of the Chief, Technical Services Branch.
A. Reference diagnostic specimens will be picked up by DASH personnel 
in the mail room at approximately 8:15 a.m. and in the early after­
noon.
B. The various types of shipping containers will be opened in the Bio­
logical Safety Cabinets (BSC) provided. (A permissible exception to 
this rule is the clearly marked parasitology specimen—these may be 
opened on the table.)
C. Acceptable safety procedures must be used at all times in the DASH 
Activity.
1. Our quarters have been carefully planned by Engineering Services 
and by the Biohazards Control Officer.
2. Biological Safety Cabinets provide negative airflow to protect 
the workers, and must be used with the glass down and fan running.
3. Laboratory coats are to be worn by workers opening specimens and 
must not be worn to lunch.
U. Gloves and protective masks will be worn when handling leaked and 
broken specimens and/or hazardous spills. A discard bag is provided 
for soiled lab coats.
D. All known or suspected infectious material is to be handled in the BSC, 
except when enroute to the individual laboratories.
1. Enroute to the laboratories, each rack of cultures will be enclosed 
in a disposable plastic bag closed with a rubber band or wire tie.
2. Bags are opened at the lab of destination and the test tube rack 
and bag are returned to DASH where the rack is reissued.
3. Used bags are discarded with the shipping containers.
E. Shipping containers will be accumulated in large wheeled trash containers.
1. Contaminated containers will be disposed of in accordance with the 
procedure for discarding broken or leaking specimens.
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2. At the end of each workday, work surfaces of tables and of BSC's 
will be wiped down with an approved disinfectant.*
P. No eating, drinking, or smoking is permitted in the specimen handling 
area.
G. No persons except those opening specimens, xeroxing 3.203 reports, and 
supervising the operations or servicing equipment and facilities are 
to enter the specimen handling area.
H. Other laboratory people who need to leave specimens or to discuss a 
problem must deposit their specimens in the appropriately marked spot 
outside the specimen handling area and must see the Activity Chief in 
the Data Handling area.
I. The specimens are packaged in sealed plastic bags and delivered to the 
laboratory units.
The sealed bag is to prevent contamination in the event that specimens 
are dropped during delivery.
J. In the event of a leaking or broken specimen, the following guide­
lines are to be followed:
1. Serology Specimens and Parasitology Specimens
a. While the serum specimens may be infectious, the risk to 
people opening shipping containers is small.
b. Even though we are temporarily forced by necessity to open 
some serum specimens and parasitology specimens on some 
occasions on the table top, we can minimize possible exposure 
by using good judgement.
(1) Open serum samples and parasitology specimens over a 
folded cloth towel, saturated with disinfectant.* Have
a discard pan filled with disinfectant* within arm's reach 
of the technician.
(2) A leaking serum specimen or fecal specimen is to be placed 
immediately into the discard pan. The 3.203 information 
form may be saved only if there is certainty that it has 
not been contaminated. A fellow technician can complete 
substitute 3.203 if there is any question about contamin­
ation of the accompanying 3.203.
2
*Issued phenolic diluted according to instructions on container.
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(3) Notify the Activity Chief or his substitute so the State 
Health Department can be notified that the specimen was 
discarded. He will phone the State so there will be no 
unnecessary delay in getting another specimen. He will 
also send a written report.
2. Cultures and Specimens Assumed to be Infectious
a. This category includes blood, animal and human tissues for 
isolation purposes, cultures, swabs, sputum, feces for bacte­
riology, cerebrospinal fluid, and other body exudates or 
fluids.
The technician is at risk while opening the specimen shipping 
container if breakage or leakage has occurred.
b. Specimens more likely to be hazardous (addressed to Mycology 
Special Pathogens Lab) will be opened in the BSC in the small 
lab, not in the main room.
c. Open all cultures and types of specimens listed above in a 
functioning biological safety cabinet.
(1) The glass front must be down and the fan on.
(2) Also open in the BSC all shipping containers on which the 
sender has failed to indicate whether the specimen is 
"serum" or "other."
(3) Opening the specimen in the BSC over a disinfectant* soaked 
cloth towel folded to a size of approximately 8 inches 
square is advisable but optional.
A discard pan containing an appropriate disinfectant must 
be in each BSC.
(H) If you find a leaking or broken specimen, have someone 
call the DASH supervisor or his alternate who will use 
his judgement as to the need for further action.
He will phone the Biohazards Control Officer and/or a 
resource person from Bacteriology, Mycology, or Virology 
if he has any question about the danger of a situation.
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*Issued phenolic diluted according to instructions on container.
3. Damaged Specimens
a. A broken specimen vial or tube, or a leaking specimen is to 
be discarded into the disinfectant in the discard pan, and 
the pan and contents autoclaved.
b. An acceptable substitute is to wrap the leaking or broken 
specimen in lab toweling, then enclose the entire mess in a 
disposable plastic bag.
c. This bag must be hand carried without delay to the incinerator, 
and the technician must stay at the incinerator until the speci­
men is placed inside and incineration begun.
d. If the 3.203 is incorrectly wrapped around the specimen vial 
or tube and is contaminated, discard with the specimen. Make 
no effort to salvage a contaminated 3.203.
e. If the 3.203 is wrapped around the inner shipping container 
and is not contaminated, it may be retained.
f. All handling of a broken or leaking specimen will take place 
inside the BSC, and there is no reason to evacuate the area.
g. The DASH supervisor will notify by phone and in writing the 
State laboratory of the problem, and that the specimen was 
discarded.
Accidental Spills of Infectious Specimens Outside of the BSC
a. If a spill occurs outside the BSC in the specimen handling area, 
and if there is any doubt whatsoever as to the nature and danger 
of the spilled material, evacuate the specimen handling rooms 
immediately.
(1) Leave all lab coats which might have been contaminated in 
the rooms.
(2) Call the DASH supervisor for assistance, and phone the 
Biohazards Control Officer.
b. As specimens are moved from the BSC to the appropriate lab­
oratory, an accidental spill could occur.
(l) The racks containing the specimens will be contained in
individual plastic bags to contain any infectious material 




(2) The person delivering specimens throughout Buildings 
#1, #5, and #7 will use a laboratory cart and will have 
with them five clean cloth towels, a supply of plastic 
bags and a plastic bottle of disinfectant.
(3) He will plan his delivery schedule so that specimens are 
delivered to each building separately.
c. If a spill occurs in a hallway, he will cover the spill with 
disinfectant-soaked towels and phone the Biohazards Control 
Officer immediately, then the DASH supervisor.
(1) If needed, he will get assistance from the nearest lab­
oratory and will stay with the mess only long enough to 
warn people of the danger.
(2) He should also ask someone to notify the responsible 
Branch Chief. (Personal clean-up is described in the 
next paragraph.)
d. A technician upon whose person infectious material has 
splashed should wipe clean with disinfectant and then proceed 
to the nearest bathroom and wash the affected area.
(1) Soap and water is effective in removing infectious ma­
terial from skin surfaces.
(2) Regular hand washing in the DASH areas should be a rou­
tine procedure.
(3 ) Clothes (lab coats, trousers, etc.) contaminated with 
spills will be placed in the cloth discard bag.
(1+) Before the bag is removed from the DASH, it will be placed 
in a second laundry bag.
(5) The double bag must be autoclaved before being sent to 
the laundry.
K. Specimens delivered to CDC laboratories:
1. The Activity Chief plus two selected employees will normally be 
given sufficient immunizations to make deliveries to Building #7. 
This will reduce the number of DASH personnel required to take the 
maximum number of immunizations.
All DASH staff can make deliveries to Buildings #1 and #5.
5
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2. All deliveries made are to be made to those laboratories and/or 
rooms so designated by the laboratory unit as areas of pickup 
and deliveries, and for no_ reason are persons making deliveries 
to stop, enter, or visit in, pick up, or touch anything in lab­
oratories and/or rooms not so designated.
6
3. All deliveries will be made with a fully safety equipped cart.
L. Immunization requirements - DASH personnel are required to have the
following immunizations and/or tests:
1. Tests
PPD TB skin test annually.
2. Immunizations
a. Polio every 20 years.
b. Smallpox every three years.
c. Tetanus and diphtheria every 10 years.
d. Typhus as recommended by the CDC Safety Office.
e. Rickettsia series and annual booster for those designated to 
work and deliver specimens to Building #7 .
f. Yellow Fever every 10 years.
3. Blood sample in Serum Bank every 20 years.
M. Work connected injuries and illnesses:
1. All injuries will be reported to your supervisor.
a. The injured employee should be sent to the Clinic for prompt 
treatment.
b. In cases where injuries are severe and patient cannot be 
moved, the Clinic should be called (extension 3385) giving 
the Clinic the following information if possible: employee's 
name, where the patient can be found, building and room number, 
etc., and type of injury.
2. If illness occurs during working hours report it to your supervisor.
a. Judgement can be made at that time whether illness is job 
related.
b. You can choose to see your personal physician or a memo to the 
Clinic can be sent by your supervisor.
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3. If illness occurs after hours and requires a physician:
a. Be sure that you or someone in your family informs your 
doctor that you work at CDC and the type of hazardous mater­
ial you come in contact with.
b. If illness is severe you should, or someone in your family 
should, contact your immediate supervisor. (Mr. George R. 
Williams, home phone - area code ¡+0̂  - 972-2286.)
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EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT SECTION 
SPECIFIC BIOSAFETY RULES
October 3, 1977
A. Equipment brought to Equipment Development Section (EDS) areas for 
repair will be received only if it is tagged with form HSM 0.593 CDC.
B. Equipment to be serviced by EDS personnel in the laboratories will be 
similarly tagged or will not be serviced.
1. In those laboratory areas that are posted as restricted entry areas, 
Section employees will contact the area Supervisor to obtain clear­
ance prior to entering the area to service equipment.
2. When working in a restricted area Section employees will abide by 
all area requirements such as protective clothing, personal hand 
washing, etc. during their time in the area and immediately upon 
leaving.
C. All Section personnel are required to receive such immunizations as 
have been accepted and approved by the Office of Biosafety that per­
tain to the areas where they are required to work.
D. Employees of the EDS are required to bring to the attention of their 
Immediate Supervisor any observed instances of breaches of biosafety 
rules, regardless of where such breaches are observed to occur.
1. Entry into Bldg. #7» Clifton Road Facility is permitted only if
one has received a smallpox vaccination within the last three years. 
This is the only such building restriction in the metropolitan 
Atlanta area.
2. However, additional restrictions do pertain to specific areas of 
certain buildings and employees must be constantly alert to 
restriction signs and abide by them.
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LABORATORY SERVICES SECTION 
SPECIFIC BIOSAFETY RULES
Unless your job specifically requires it, you have no legitimate 
reason to enter any laboratory. If your job does require you to 
enter a laboratory, and only supervisors, clerical, and delivery 
personnel and their substitutes are required to do this, you must be 
aware of the following requirements:
1. Restricted buildings:
Any CDC employee can enter any building in the metropolitan 
Atlanta area for business purposes except Bldg. #7 at the Clifton 
Road Facility. In order to enter this building you must have had 
a smallpox vaccination within the last three years. If you haven't 
had such an immunization, stay out of Bldg. #7.
2. Restricted corridors in buildings:
The basement floor of Bldg. #7 has a restricted corridor. It is 
the eastern most north-south corridor on the basement floor. In 
order to enter this corridor you must have a current Rocky Mountain 
Spotted Fever inoculation and a current Typhus inoculation. If 
you don't have both of these inoculations, stay out of that corri­
dor even though you have a current smallpox vaccination and are 
allowed in Bldg. #7-
3. Restricted laboratories and laboratory areas:
All other CDC restricted laboratories and laboratory areas in the 
metropolitan area that work with human disease-causing organisms 
may from time to time be posted as restricted areas. This is done 
when the work that is going on at the time requires it.
Placards are posted on the laboratory doors and even sometimes on 
the corridor doors when this type of work is being done. These 
posted notices would be in Buildings #1, #5, and #7 at the Clifton 
Road Facility and possibly even at Chamblee and Lawrenceville.
It is your responsibility to be aware of this situation, recognize 
all such placards and obey them whenever and wherever they are 
posted.
Some examples where this happens are:
a. Building #7, first floor, westerly north-south corridor:
(l) This corridor is sometimes placarded that you need a 
Polio inoculation to use the corridor.
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(2) This same corridor is sometimes placarded stating that 
you need a Yellow Fever inoculation to use the corridor.
b. Building #7» second floor, easterly north-south corridor is 
sometimes placarded that to enter the corridor you need cur­
rent Rabies inoculation.
c. Building #5, all floors are on occasion placarded on a labor­
atory by laboratory basis telling everyone, except those who 
work there to keep out unless they have had a specific immuni­
zation, and the name of the disease is on the placard.
d. Building #1, south wing, first floor, easterly north-south 
corridor, room 1383 is sometimes posted warning you that you 
must have Anthrax protection before you can enter the laboratory.
As stated before, these are but some of the examples, others can 
and will, from time to time, occur. Also, as stated before, it 
is your responsibility to recognize such signs and placards and to 
obey them without fail. Your family and friends must rely on 
your good judgement in this regard because they have no way of 
knowing if you elected to enter a posted area knowing that you 
shouldn't have done so.
B. Eating, drinking, and smoking can be done in any Laboratory Services 
Section spaces except as otherwise posted.
C. Protective clothing is provided for all Section personnel except 
clerical personnel. Delivery personnel who must enter other buildings, 
and on occasion laboratories, are required to wear protective clothing. 
Gloves are required to be worn at all times when picking up discarded 
material.
Do not remove containers of discarded materials from autoclaves unless 
the indicator tape shows that decontamination temperatures have been 
reached during the autoclave cycle. Always wash your hands thoroughly 
after working with discarded materials.
Do not remove from container or sort soiled wearing apparel unless you 
are wearing gloves and a mask. Wash your hands thoroughly after com­
pleting this task and discarding gloves versus putting them someplace 
for reuse.
E. When working on a discard pickup job, always report to your Immediate
Supervisor any observed instances of improperly placed discard materials.
Always notify your Immediate Supervisor if you believe an accident may 
have exposed you to any contaminated material.
G. Check with your Immediate Supervisor as to the location of acceptable 




Your Immediate Supervisor will advise you if it is necessary to have 




The Serum Bank laboratory area is relatively clean when one compares in­
herent hazards with those existing in Bldgs. #1, #5, and #7. There is a 
possibility that Bank personnel may be exposed to hepatitis when handling 
and processing commercial blood products, solicited convalescent specimens, 
and serum collections. There is also an outside chance of exposure to 
viremia in convalescent bloods. Most bloods, however, are collected after 
the viremic stage of the disease.
A. Handling of Blood Products
1. All personnel are instructed to treat all bloods being received 
as potentially hazardous. This includes products tested by 
commercial suppliers and reported by them to be negative.
2. Bench tops are to be wiped daily with Amphyl solution. Dispos­
able toweling with plastic backing is used to cover work sites 
thereby minimizing actual contamination of the bench top surfaces. 
Toweling is disposed of in discard pans and subjected to steam 
sterilization.
3. Surgical gloves are to be worn when working with materials known 
to be contaminated, and bench tops are to be wiped with Amphyl 
immediately after working with materials known to be contaminated.
1+. All supplies, glassware, needles, etc. used in processing blood 
products are autoclaved by Laboratory Services personnel. Dis­
cards are placed in appropriate pans, labeled with building and 
room number, and taped with indicator tape. Water is added to 
pans just prior to pickup.
B. Delivery of Products to Other Laboratory Areas
1. Delivery services are not usually provided. Any delivery deemed 
necessary will be made to office areas only.
(if office is in restricted area, immunizations may be necessary.)
C. Liquid Nitrogen Activities
1. Eye protection (shields, glasses) will be worn when dispensing 
LN2 or retrieveing specimens from storage.
2. Retrieval of pathogenic specimens from storage could be extremely 
hazardous. Liquid nitrogen leaking into an improperly sealed or 
cracked vial that is stored in the liquid phase could cause the 
vial to explode if removed and immediately subjected to room
SERUM BANK SECTION
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temperature. As a necessary precaution all specimens to be 
removed are elevated from the liquid to the vapor stage area of 
the freezer and held there for at least one hour before transfer 
to room temperature and/or a 3T°C water bath.
D. Immunizations
Anyone required to enter Building #7 must have had a smallpox vaccina­
tion within the last three years.
E. Equipment Repair
1. Decontaminate with Amphyl.
2. Maintenance personnel are required to get assurance of decontam­
ination from Serum Bank Office prior to working on equipment or 
removing for repair in maintenance shop.
2
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TO
All CDC Employees d a t e :  October 20, 1977
FR°to Director, CDC 
S,,BJECT: Laboratory Safety
In 30 years of operation, our laboratories have had an exemplary record 
for the safety of the people who work in them. In February of this 
year, two employees died suddenly and tragically. Their deaths were 
caused by Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever. Their infection was almost 
certainly acquired in the area in which they worked. They were the 
first laboratory-related deaths in the history of CDC.
Following the two deaths, a thorough evaluation of our safety 
procedures was initiated to determine if there were additional stepB 
that could be taken to assure that safety procedures were as complete 
as possible. One part of this evaluation involved a complete investigation 
of the circumstances surrounding the two deaths. I now have a final 
report of this investigation. It is available to any interested employee.
A second part of the evaluation was the formation of a Task Force on 
Laboratory Safety. While this Task Force has not completed its final 
report, I am aware of its major deliberations. There are several 
actions that will be initiated immediately. They are:
1. Restrict Access to Laboratories. When our work force was 
smaller, our mission less complex, and we worked with fewer 
potentially dangerous agents, it was possible to rely on warning 
signs and written procedures to restrict unnecessary access to 
laboratories. This is no longer so. It is now necessary to 
assure that access is restricted to authorized personnel by 
locking laboratory doors and developing a system of identification.
The highest priority areas will be buildings 7, 8, and 9, but 
other laboratories will be evaluated to see if restrictions 
should be imposed. The Office of Biosafety is responsible for 
accomplishing this action.
2. Safety Training. The Safety Manual and the Etiologic Agents 
Manual serve as the basic reference documents far laboratory 
safety. Both will be reviewed and updated. Steps will be taken 
to assure that all appropriate supervisors and employees sre 
aware of and have access to these manuals. Additional attention • 
will be given to formal training in laboratory safety. The
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Office of Biosafety will be responsible for updating the manuals 
and the Personnel Management Office will be responsible for 
assuring that proper training in laboratory safety is provided.
3. Immunization of Employees. To assure that employees are 
adequately immunized against agents with which they might come 
in contact, we must have an effective system to determine which 
employees need to be immunized against various agents, to identify 
these employees, and then to monitor compliance with the require­
ments. An ad hoc group has already looked at our current procedures. 
The Office of Biosafety will develop this system.
4. Surveillance of Employee Illness. It is essential that we 
have a surveillance system to identify, on a daily basis, any ill 
workers who might have been in contact with highly pathogenic 
agents. A comprehensive program to collect such health information, 
evaluate it, and follow up as appropriate will be instituted. The 
Bureau of Epidemiology will develop a surveillance system and a 
follow-up action plan.
5. Monitoring of Laboratory Safety. To carry out these recom­
mendations and to generally strengthen our monitoring of laboratory 
safety, the staff of the Office of Biosafety will be increased by 
four additional positions.
Laboratory safety concerns all of us, and I am well aware that many 
Positive actions have been taken, both individually and collectively, 
since February. The formal actions being announced today, coupled with 
those earlier activities, and further suggestions expected from the 
Task Force, will assure us that all appropriate steps are taken to 
provide the safest possible conditions for all CDC employees. Continuing 
suggestions from employees for further improvements are welcomed and 
should be directed to the Office of Biosafety.
William H. Foege,^f.D.
Assistant Surgeon General
Me m o r a n d u m
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 
CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL
TO
All CDC Laboratorians DATE: October 28, 1977
: Chief, Technical Services Branch
SIjB]Ec t - t, .
Biosafety and Control of Discard Materials
The purpose of this memorandum is to gather together in one paper various 
issuances pertaining to discard procedures, biosafety rules, protocols, 
and suggested techniques relative to your association with the Laboratory 
Services Section. It supersedes and replaces all such previous memorandums.
It is recommended that this memorandum be posted in 
the laboratory as a ready reference in training new 
employees and for periodic review by others.
A. Each discard pan is inspected for pin holes and leaks before it is 
distributed by the Laboratory Services Section. We check these pans 
by totally immersing them upside down in a deep sink of water. If 
there is a leak, however small, a readily discernible stream of bubbles 
appears, and the pan is sent to Engineering Services metal shop for 
repair and return. Pans which can't be repaired are discarded, and 
repaired ones are rechecked and returned to the system.
However, this method of checking is not an absolute guarantee that you 
won't receive an occasional discard pan that leaks. Every leak has to 
start somewhere sometime and it may be that it will start in your lab­
oratory. If you do find a pan that leaks, place a piece of tape on 
it stating that it leaks so that we, in turn, can either have it re­
paired or throw it away.
All contaminated containers should have their closures loosened before 
being placed into the appropriate size discard pan. These stainless 
steel pans are allocated as follows: size 6" x 8" x 11" for needles, 
syringes, and other small items; size V  x 8" x 18" for pipets and 
tubes; size 8" x 8" x 18" for bottles, beakers, and other large con­
tainers .
Each discard pan must have approximately 1" of water or other aqueous 
solution added to it before it is taken from the laboratory to be auto- 
claved. The liquid not only drives the air up and out of the pan during
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the beginning of the autoclave cycle, thus permitting live steam to 
enter the pan and come into contact with all surfaces of the pan con­
tents, but also provides sufficient moisture during the last stage of 
the autoclave cycle so that material doesn't become so baked to glass­
ware that it is difficult to remove in our washing procedures.
It is the responsibility of each laboratorian who uses discard pans 
to add water or an aqueous germicidal solution to discard pans before 
they leave the laboratory for autoclaving. Laboratory Services Section 
personnel have been directed not to look into pans to see if there is 
sufficient liquid in them. This is a grave responsibility and should 
be treated as such.
All disposable items, whether glass or plastic, can be discarded in 
the same container but should never be placed in a discard pan with 
reusable items. When we receive a pan of autoclaved disposable items 
we can simply dump the contents into a garbage can. However, if re­
usable items are intermixed with disposables our staff is exposed to 
hand stabs and cuts as we attempt to sort them.
Reusable needles and syringes require special treatment so that we can 
recover as high a percentage of them as possible. After they are used, 
they should be placed in 6" x 8" x 11" pans and as a general rule 
should not be accompanied by other items because of the risk of needle 
stabs during sorting. Syringe plungers and barrels should be carefully 
separated so that steam can come into contact with all surfaces, and 
both should be totally immersed in water or some aqueous solution as 
soon as possible after use to prevent material from drying on surfaces.
Disposable needle and syringe units need not be separated, but can be 
discarded intact into disposable items discard pans.
Also very important is remembering not to place heavy items on the top 
of light, fragile items in a discard pan. These pans all have to be 
transported across doorway thresholds and on and off elevators and 
receive some relatively sharp bumps in the process.
Stainless steel items such as 6" x 6" baskets, test tube racks, petri 
dish canisters, and pipet canisters in which you receive materials from 
Media and Glassware may become contaminated in your main laboratory or 
when used in a Biological Safety Cabinet. When the Laboratory Super­
visor judges that such contamination has occurred, it is his responsi­
bility to ascertain that these items are decontaminated by some accept­
able method before being returned to the Laboratory Services Section 
for reuse and reissue.
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The principle stated above can and should be applied to any items that 
enter your laboratory which must subsequently be handled by non- 
scientific support personnel.
B. Because hundreds of individuals are involved in these discard proce­
dures, and all of us do make mistakes, we must have a system of identi­
fying the source of improperly discarded materials. The purpose of 
this identification is corrective, not punitive.
After the appropriate authority, usually the Laboratory Chief, has 
made the decision that the contents of discard pans should or should 
not be autoclaved, the pans should be marked as follows:
1. To-be-autoclaved pans:
a. A discard pan to be autoclaved should have the appropriate 
white "BUILDING AND ROOM NUMBER" label placed on one end of 
the pan.
b. In addition to the above label, a 5" to 8" strip of "AUTOCLAVE 
TAPE" should be affixed vertically to the same end of the pan 
and should extend onto the horizontal surface of the pan lid, 
thereby identifying pan and lid as one unit.
2. Not-to-be autoclaved pans:
a. A discard pan that does not require autoclaving should have 
the appropriate white "BUILDING AND ROOM NUMBER" label placed 
on one end of the pans.
b. In addition, a green "DO NOT AUTOCLAVE" label should be placed 
on the same end of the pan.
Every discard pan, regardless of category, must have a lid on it so that 
pans can be stacked. This is your responsibility. If a piece of lab­
oratory glassware is so large that it cannot be placed in a pan, treat 
it individually and label it accordingly.
Do not place either the white "BUILDING AND ROOM NUMBER" label or the 
green "DO NOT AUTOCLAVE" label on the lid of the pan. Always place 
labels on the same end of the pan.
Further, laboratorians are responsible for transporting all pans con­
taining discards to the autoclave room whether their Chief instructs 
them to do the autoclaving or the autoclaving is left to Laboratory 
Services Section personnel.
All CDC Laboratorians 3
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It is the policy, and responsibility, of this Branch that all auto­
claves at CDC used for decontaminating glassware and other materials 
which subsequently come to the Laboratory Services Section have the 
efficacy of their operating cycle confirmed once each month with 
-Kilit ampules.
C. Laboratory Services Section personnel will continue, as in the past, 
to deliver glassware and media to your laboratories and clean discard 
pans to the autoclave rooms. However, when your laboratory doors are 
posted, or placarded, with restricted entry signs because of the nature 
of the work being done, it is requested that one of your own laboratory 
carts be placed immediately outside your closed laboratory door so that 
delivered material can be placed on it rather than expecting our per­
sonnel to enter your laboratory. If this is not practical or possible, 
place a sign on your door explaining where the delivery can be put.
The necessity of observing safety precautions and the 
desire to comply must be instilled in each laboratorian. 
Laboratory Chiefs are responsible for the prevention 
schemes and protective equipment incidental to the work 
in their laboratories.
The problem of safety in its simplest form is one of 
control because the state of the art is sufficiently well 
advanced to have determined aseptic techniques and to 
have evolved excellent control equipment. Control can 
best be assured by the participation and personal involve­
ment of all employees. Reasonable involvement of all 
employees on a periodic basis will do much to ensure a 
well-integrated safety program.
A variety of hazards may be encountered by persons work­
ing in non-scientific jobs, not the least of which may be 
those dangers that arise out of the employees’ lack of 
knowledge of "things microbiological." However, it is the 
right of such employees to assume that all apparatus 
received by them from laboratories is microbially and 
pathogenically safe unless they are specifically informed 
to the contrary.
It is the moral duty of the laboratorian to have know­
ledge of the materials and equipment he uses and to take
CDC Laboratorians
due precautions based on this knowledge to protect non­
laboratory personnel.
In order to bring about the above, it is necessary to 
have a program with adequate guidelines for a continuous, 
aggressive, comprehensive, and responsible effort by all 
employees to reduce and keep to a minimum the waste of 
manpower, materials, and other monetary losses caused by 
accidents. Planning for accident prevention should be a 
part of all research, development, maintenance, repair, 
and construction, as well as of the daily procedures of 
every laboratory.
T H E  B O T T O M  L I N E
Remember, each Laboratory Chief is responsible 
for the safety of all those who enter his 
laboratory, plus all those who come in contact 





A Review of Laboratory Accidents and Laboratory-Associated Infections at 
CDC for the Period 1947-1976.
William J. Martone, M.D.
From 1947 through 1976, 124 laboratory-acquired infections were 
identified at CDC. Bacteria and viruses caused 63i of the cases. Accidents 
Preceded only 33% of the illnesses.
miBODUCTION
Reports of laboratory-acquired infections have appeared frequently in 
the literature. Most are reports of individual case or epidemiologic 
studies of isolated outbreaks. Surveys of laboratory-acquired infections 
which have occurred in a given time frame (1-4) and in particular 
laboratories (5-9) have contributed to our knowledge of common patterns of 
transmission, clinical presentation and treatment, and they indicate the 
wide variety of agents which have been involved.
There are, however, relatively few reports concerning infection rates 
among laboratorians, and in recent years, attention has apparently shifted 
to the risk of health care personnel acquiring hepatitis or tuberculosis 
(10-17). As a result, it is difficult to clearly define areas of high risk 
0r to determine changing patterns of illness among laboratory workers. 
Significant changes in infection frequencies are often obscured 
by small numbers of yearly cases, absence of standard guidelines for 
deporting, and the lack of well-defined populations at risk.
In this report, laboratory-acquired infections which have occurred at 
the CDC since 1947 are reviewed. Much of this information was gathered in 
an extensive survey conducted by the Office of Biosafety, CDC, in 1973 and 
was incorporated in a previous publication (4). Also included in this 
report is the first attempt to determine crude infection and laboratory 
accident frequencies at CDC for the years 1970-1976. This approach should 
serve as a guideline for future surveillance activities both at the CDC and 
other institutions. Deficiencies encountered in reporting infections and 
high-risk accidents, and problems of data acquisition and access are 
indicated; methods to correct these deficiencies are recommended.
METHODS
In identifying cases for the 1947-73 period the Office of Biosafety 
used the following sources of information: 1) CDC Accident Report forms 
(#CDC 0.304), 2) compensation claims forms (CA1 and CA2), and 3) personal
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interviews with laboratorians and laboratory supervisors. Individuals who 
had been ill and were still employed at the CDC were also queried.
Information obtained included: date of acquisition, method of confirmation 
(for example, serology and culture), most likely source of infection, and 
duration of illness. Cases detected solely by personal interview for the 
years 1970-73 were tabulated separately.
Infections occurring from 1974 to 1976 were identified by methods 
similar to those outlined above; however, except in a few cases, personal 
interviews were not conducted.
For the 1947-76 period, a case was defined as an individual with a 
history of known or potential exposure to an infectious agent during field 
investigation or laboratory activity who developed an apparent or 
inapparent infection, with definitive diagnostic evidence of such infection • 
(for example, isolation or demonstration of agent in clinical specimens, 
seroconversion, or skin-test conversion).
For crude estimates of laboratory and field accident and infection 
rates, population data were derived from personnel staffing lists for the 
30th of June of each year from 1971 through 1976, and for the 31st of 
December, 1970. The populations at risk included employees of the Ecologic 
Investigation Program, Epidemiology Program, Laboratory Division, Malaria 
Program, State and Community Services Division, Bureau of Tropical 
Diseases, Bureau of Epidemiology, and Bureau of Laboratories in the 
following categories: laboratory workers; animal caretakers; insectary 
workers; laboratory equipment operators; warehousemen in the Bureau of 
Laboratories; biological sciences employees; medical, dental, hospital, and 
public health employees; veterinarians; and engineers. The presence of 
visiting scientists, students, and other short-term laboratory personnel, 
as well as staffing changes that occurred after the 30th of June of any 
year, may have resulted in variations in population estimates.
All laboratory and field accidents occurring in the period 1970-76 
which resulted in injury and/or possible exposure to microbiological agents 
were derived from CDC Accident Report forms (#CDC 0.304) and employee 
compensation claim forms (CA1 and CA2). Laboratory and field accidents 
(and/or exposures) considered high-risk for acquisition of infection were 
tabulated separately. The criteria used for the selection of high-risk 
accidents were as follows:
1. Inoculations, ingestion, or conjunctival exposure of material 
known to contain infectious agents (including HAA + sera).
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2. Spills, splashes, or accidental aerosolizations of agents in 
categories L, 0, P-R, T-Z, AA-EE*.
3. Spills, splashes, or accidental aerosolizations of agents in 
categories G, K, M, and S involving unimmunized or inadequately 
immunized individuals .
4. Inoculations of material from, or bites by, known infectious 
insect vectors.
5. Bites of laboratory animals known to be infected with pathogenic 
agents.
Yearly population totals were multiplied by 2080 Equivalent 
Hours/Year/ Employee (17), with the assumption that each person worked 40 
hours each week for the entire year. Resultant values were expressed as 
Equivalent Hours (X100,000). Infection and accident rates were calculated 
by dividing the number of infections or accidents occurring per year by the 
Equivalent Hours. These frequencies were expressed as the Number 
Infections/100,000 person-hours Number Accidents/100,000 person/hours. 
Accidents were separated into total and high-risk categories.
Facility and building designations other than those currently in use 
were converted to the present designations.
M SULTS
From 1947 to 1976, there were 124 laboratory and field acquired 
infections (Figure 1). Of these, 109 had been previously identified by the 
Office of Biosafety for 1947-1973; the remaining 15, occuring in 1974-76, 
were found by review of CDC Accident Report forms and employee compensation 
forms CA1 and CA2. For the sake of completeness, the total included 3 
illnesses due to Ascaris sensitivity and 1 unspecified wound infection 
following a laboratory animal scratch. Laboratory acquired infections 
accounted for 103 of 124 (83$) illnesses; field-acquired infections 
accounted for the remaining 21 (17%). The largest number of illnesses 
occurred in 1966, when 1 field and 9 laboratory acquired infections were 
recognized. No deaths directly attributable to these illnesses were noted.
For the period 1947-76, an antecedent laboratory accident was 
identified in only 34 (33%) of the 103 laboratory acquired illnesses 
(Table 1). Of these accidents, autoinoculation (21$) and mouth pipetting
•Categories as described in Lab Safety at the Center for Disease Controlr 
DHEW Publication No. CDC 76-8118, Center for Disease Control, Public 
Health Service, U. S. Department of Health Education, and Welfare, 
Atlanta, Georgia, pp II-4, through II-6.
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(15%) were the most common (Table 2). Similarly, only 4 of the 21 (19%) 
field acquired infections were attributable to a field-associated accident; 
all 4 were the result of an insect vector bite.
Classification of illnesses by agent revealed the wide variety of 
pathogens involved (Table 3). Including 1 case of acute glomerulonephritis 
following work with type 12 Streptococcus and an unspecified wound 
infection following a scratch by a laboratory animal, bacterial infections 
accounted for 42 of the 124 infections (34%). Diseases due to viral agents 
were the second most common (36 of 124 cases, or 29%). Together, bacterial 
and viral infections accounted for 63% of the laboratory and field- 
associated infections at the CDC for this period.
The category of agent causing most illnesses in a particular building 
or facility correlated strongly with the predominant category of agent 
maintained and investigated in that facility (Table 4). In instances where 
primary responsibility for a particular agent shifted to a new facility, 
illness due to that agent reemerged in the new facility.
Five of 9 illnesses at Fort Collins (56%) and 7 of 10 illnesses at 
Kansas City (70%) were acquired in the field. The relatively high 
proportion of field-acquired infections at Fort Collins and Kansas City 
were, in part, a reflection of the heavy assignment of field activities at 
these facilities. All of the field-acquired illnesses at Kansas City were 
due to H. capsulatum. and 4 of 5 field-acquired illnesses at Fort Collins 
were due to Colorado Tick Fever virus.
The yearly high-risk and total accident rates for the seven combined 
CDC facilities remained fairly constant for the period 1970-76, the only 
exceptions being 1971 and 1972 when the total accident rates rose slightly. 
The mean total accident rate of 4.5 accidents/100,000 person-hours/year 
was 76% higher than the mean high-risk accident rate of 1.1 
accidents/100,000 person-hours/year (Tables 5 and 6, Figure 2). In 
contrast to the accident rates for the combined facilities, the rates 
varied considerably from facility to facility in a given year and from year 
to year in a given facility. Of the 119 high-risk accidents occurring from 
1970 through 1976, 5 resulted in laboratory-acquired infections.
Except for Phoenix, where the infections were sporadic, the number of 
yearly infections by facility was of a low order (Table 7). The overall 
yearly infection rates for the seven combined CDC facilities remained 
constant, ranging from 0.2 - 0.4 infections/100,000 person-hours/year, with 
a mean of 0.3 infections/100,000 person-hours/year (Table 7, Figure 2).
The frequency of infections preceded by high-risk accidents can be esti­
mated to be 10-15% of the mean infection frequency, since, as previously 
noted, five high-risk accidents for 1970-76 resulted in infection.
The mean infection rates for the 7-year period were higher for the 
Fort Collins and Phoenix facilities than for the Chamblee or Clifton Road
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facilities. When field-acquired infections were excluded from the 
detemination of the Fort Collins rate (not shown in the tables), however, 
the average yearly rate approximated that of the Clifton Road facility.
Of the 23 cases for 1970-73, only 9 were reported on CDC Accident 
Report forms or employee compensation forms; 14 (61%) were discovered only 
after personal interview of laboratorians and laboratory supervisors. All 
cases reported on forms CA1 and CA2 for this period were also reported on 
Accident Report forms. Of the 15 cases occurring from 1974-76, all but 1 
was reported on Accident Report forms.
DISCUSSION
One of the most outstanding characteristics of the study results 
involved the overall number of illnesses which investigators could not 
attribute to an accident. Other reports have similarly described a large 
proportion of infections which were not actually preceded by accidents 
(1-4). Unrecognized aerosolizations of microbiological agents have been 
thought to contribute to most of these infections (18-19). Doubtlessly, 
errors not recognized as accidents have also been involved. Technological 
advances aimed at decreasing these potentials should continue to improve 
laboratory safety records.
Although CDC high-risk accident and infection rates for 1970-76 appear 
to have been relatively constant, these rates are, at most, crude 
estimates. The assumption that all individuals included in the population 
totals were continuously at risk (that is, worked 40 hours/week in the 
laboratory), and the failure to exclude immunized or otherwise immune 
individuals from these determinations, resulted in minimal rates The 
accuracy of these estimates for individual facilities was variable, since 
some facilities had more clearly defined populations than others. Any 
conclusion which might have been drawn concerning small differences in 
accident and illness rates between these facilities was thus judged 
unreasonable.
Similar underestimates in the number of infections were likely, 
especially for infections occurring from 1974 through 1976 when detection 
of a case depended solely on voluntary reporting. The deficiencies of a 
largely passive surveillance system for the identificaiton of laboratory- 
acquired infections were indicated by the observation that for 1970-73, 61 % 
of infections were discovered only after personal interview with 
laboratorians and laboratory supervisors. Thus, the frequencies for 
1974-76 might have been higher had the same method of case detection been 
used for this period.
Phillips compared estimated frequency rates for laboratory-acquired 
infections among various institutions and concluded that typical values of
1.0-5.0 infections/1,000,000 man-hours could be found where adequate 




man-hours for the CDC for 1959-62 was slightly lower and involved a 
different time frame than that of this investigation, he did not describe 
the methods used to arrive at this figure.
In part, any measure of the effectiveness of training or biosafety 
programs must be based on accurate determinations of yearly frequencies of 
accidents and infection. Significant deviations above or below expected 
values might thus signify the need to investigate special situations or the 
overall success of such programs. Similarly, with such determinations the 
impact of technological and procedural biosafety improvements may be more 
accurately documented.
A successful system for determining yearly rates of infection and 
high-risk accidents would depend largely on three major areas of 
investigation: 1) detecting and confirming the case; 2) developing 
criteria for identifying the population at risk; and 3) developing criteria 
for high-risk accidents with the efficient reporting and follow-up of these 
accidents.
Surveillance of laboratory-acquired infections at CDC could be 
expanded to include other institutions. Uniformity in collecting data 
should enable participating institutions to compare illness and accident 










Figure 1. Laboratory and Field Acquired Infections, 
CDC, 1947-1976*
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Table 1. Laboratory Acquired Infectious Diseases
by Accident Category, CDC, 1947-1976*
Category Number 1 of Total
Result of a lab accident 34 33%
Worked with agent 65 63%
Unknown 4 42
Total 103 100%
♦Excludes 21 field acquired infections, 4 of which 
were preceded by an insect vector bite.
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Table 2. Laboratory Acquired Infectious Diseases 
Preceded by an Accident by Accident 






Blenders and Centrifuges 3
Laboratory Animal Bites 3
Mechanical Failure of BSC* 2
Pre-existing Wound Infection 2





Group A Streptococcus (1), Clostridia 
septicum (1), SLE virus (1),
West Nile virus (1), Omsk Hemorrhagic 
Fever virus (1), Toxoplasma gondii (2)
Salmonella sp. (1), Shigella sp. (1), 
Leptospira interrogans (2), Rio 
Bravo virus (1).
Corynebacterium diphtheriae (1), 
Leptospira interrogans (1), VEE 
virus (2)
Group A Streptococcus (1), VEE 
virus (2)
Rio Bravo virus (1), Ossa virus (1)
■ unspecified wound infection (1).
Rickettsia mooserl (2)
Group A Streptococcus (1), Salmonella 
8£. (1)
Shigella sp. (1)
Group A Streptococcus (1), Salmonella 
sp. (2), Neisseria meningiditis (1) 




T able 3 . L ab o ra to ry  and F ie ld  A cq u ired  I n f e c t i o n s  by  A g en t, CDC, 1947-1976
BACTERIAL («0) 
Mycobacteria tuberculosis (8) 
Group A Streptococcus (7) 
Shigella sp. (6)
Brucella sp. (5)
Leptospira Interrogans (4) 
Salmonella sp. (4)
Neisseria menlngldltls (1) 
Clostridia septlcua (1) 
Borrelia sp. (1)
Pseudomonas pseudonallel (1) 
Corynebacterlua dlphtherlae (1) 
Atypical «ycobacterla (1)
VIRAL (36)
Venezuelan Encephalitis Virus (6)
Hepatitis A (6)
Colorado Tick Fever Virus (4)
Hepatitis B (4)
Hepatitis A or B (3)
Rio Bravo Virus (2)
Newcastle Disease Virus (2)
Simian Adenovirus X (1)
Ossa Virus (1)
West Nile Virus (1)
Omsk Hemorrhagic Fever Virus (1)
Saint Louis Encephalitis Virus (1)
Dengue virus (1)
Group B Tick Borne Encephalitis Virus (1) 
California Encephalitis Virus (1)
Swine Influenza Virus (A/New Jersey/76) (1)
FUNCAL (19) 
Hlstoplasma capsulatum (13) 
Coccldloldes lmmltls (3) 
Candida albicans (1) 




Clamydia pslttacl (9) 









following work with Group A 
Streptococcus (type 12) (1)
Unspecified wound infection 
following a laboratory anloal 
scratch (1)
Table 4. Laboratory and Field Acquired Infections
by Agent and Facility, CDC, 1947-1976*
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B* c t e r i a l 18(3)** 6 1 0 11 3(1) 0 0 0 0 39(4)
v i> a l 1 2 1 8 K l ) 6(4) 0 4 10 2(2) 35(7)
r u n g a i 2 5 0 0 0 0 10(7) 0 0 2(1) 19(8)
^ a s i t i c 0 6 0 0 3(1) 0 0 0 0 0 9(1)
5 j c k e t t s i a l /  0  
• a n iy d ia l
0 0 1 6 0 0 9 0 1(1) 17(1)
O th e r 0 0
1 * * *  ]★ * * * 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
T° t a l 21(3) 19 3 10 21(2) 9(5) 10(7) 13 10 5(4) 121(21)
Las Cruces (1 viral), Savannah (1 rickettsial), and Lawrenceville (1 bacterial)
H  are not shown.
Numbers in parentheses refer to illnesses acquired as a result of field investiaatior 
in which the illness corresponds to the particular agent being studied by that 
H  facility or by that particular group.
.* Unspecified wound infection following a laboratory animal scratch.
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Table 7. Laboratory, Laboratory Animal, and Field Acquired Infection Rates by Facility and Year, CDC, 1970-1976
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Clifton Road
Building 1 356 7.4 0 0.0 385 8.0 2(1)* 0.3 395 8.2 1 0.1 393 8.2 1(1) 0.1 397 8.2 1 0.1 438 9.1 0 0.0 410 8.5 1 0.1 8.2 0.9 0.1
Building 5 80 1.7 1 0.6 107 2.2 2 0.9 119 2.5 1 0.4 128 2.7 2 0.7 111 2.3 0 0.0 " 7 2’4 3 ’’3 128 2 '7 1 °'4 2-4 1-4 °'6
Building 6 101 2.1 0 0.0 93 1.9 0 0.0 82 1.7 0 0.0 55 1.1 0 0.0 39 0.8 1 1.3 40 °'8 0 °'° 38 0 8 0 °'° 1-3 0 '' °‘'
Building 7 82 1.7 0 0.0 84 1.7 1 0.6 89 1.9 0 0.0 80 1.7 1 0.6 68 1.4 0 0.0 73 1,5 ' 0-7 78 ’6 ' °'6 ''6 °'6 °'4
Chamblee 15 0.3 0 0.0 12 0.3 1 3.3 14** 0.3 1 3.3 14 0.3 0 0.0 77 1.6 1(1) 0.6 79 1,6 0 °'0 90 1-9 0 0,0 0,9 °'4 °'4
Fort Collins 48 1.0 2(1) 2.0 48 1.0 1(1) 1.0 49 1.0 0 0.0 41 0.9 1(1) 1.1 52 1.1 1(1) 0.9 56 1,2 2*'' ’-7 59 1 2 0 0 0 1-1 1,1 0-9
Phoenix 44 0.9 0 0.0 30 0.6 0 0.0 35 0.7 4 5.7 34 0.7 0 0.0 27 0.6 1 1.7 31 °'6 0 30 0,6 0 0 0 °'7 °'7 1-0
Total 726 15.1 3 0.2 759 15.8 7 0.4 783 16.2 7 0.4 745 15.5 5 0.3 771 16.0 5 0.3 834 17.3 6 0.4 833 17.3 3 0.2 16.1 5.1 0.3
(all facilities)
•Numbers in parentheses refer to illness acquired as a result of field investigations in which the illness corresponds to the particular agent being 





Figure 2. Total Accident, H igh-Risk Accident and Laboratory 
Acquired Infection Rates, CDC, 1970-1976
0—0 Total
laboratory accidents
* ..*  H igh-risk laboratory
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Medical surveillance, and, within certain limits, medical care of CDC 
personnel should be a CDC responsibility. Official duties may require that 
individuals work with infectious agents, enter laboratories containing 
infectious agents, or work with potentially contaminated laboratory 
discards, such as used glassware. In other instances, individuals may 
inadvertently enter restricted areas without appropriate immunizations.
Because many of the agents under investigation are highly infectious 
and/or not native to the United States, insuring that the community is 
adequately protected against the unauthorized as well as inadvertent 
release of these organisms should also be a CDC responsibility. An 
organized medical surveillance and medical care scheme for CDC personnel 
would fulfill one facet of this obligation, namely, to safeguard against 
unknowing release of organisms as a result of inapparent or unrecognized 
human infection. The scheme would also generally upgrade preventive 
medical services for employees.
Minimum Guidelines for Medical Surveillance and Medical Care
An effective medical surveillance plan must take into account and 
attain specific goals in at least these following four situations:
1) high- risk laboratory accidents, 2) laboratory-acquired infections,
3) absenteeism, and 4) entries into restricted areas by individuals who are 
not properly immunized.
For the purposes of this report, a high-risk laboratory accident can 
be viewed as one which places the involved individual or individuals at 
unusual risk of acquiring an infection with agents being used in the 
laboratory. The criteria may vary depending on 1) the nature of the 
accident, 2) the class of agent involved, and 3) the immune status of those 
exposed. All accidents involving laboratorians must be reported to the 
immediate supervisor, and the supervisor should be responsible for deciding 
within pre-existing guidelines, whether the accident is high-risk. If the 
supervisor decides that it is high risk, he or she would then be 
responsible for reporting the incident to the CDC Medical Epidemiologist 
(see proposal below). If a high-risk accident occurs, those at risk must 
be identified, and monitored and appropriate preventive measures must be 
applied. Efforts to counter the eventuality of person-to-person, and in 
certain cases, person-to-vector transmission must be viewed within the 
context of agent class. The Office of Biosafety must investigate to 
determine if the accident was due to malfunctioning equipment, inadequate 
facilities, or procedural error, and any deficiencies must be corrected. 
When decontamination of facilities is warranted, Office of Biosafety 
officals should supervise the decontamination. If an infection should 
occur, there must be an assurance that the individuals involved receive 
expert medical care and consultation.
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If the laboratory-acquired illness is not preceded by an accident, it 
must be assumed that the cause was due to a microbiological aerosol, and 
those who are potentially at risk, but who are not ill, should be carefully 
identified and monitored (1). Appropriate preventive measures can be 
applied as indicated. Co-primary cases should be carefully sought. If 
person-to-person transmission is likely, all those in contact with cases 
should be identified and monitored. Where applicable, appropriate 
prophylactic therapy must be supervised, and adequate preventive measures 
taken to assure that further person-to-person and/or person-to-vector 
transmission is kept at a minimum. Office of Biosafety officials must 
investigate and correct potential sources of infection. Decontamination 
procedures must be monitored to insure their adequacy and effectiveness.
To expediently identify unrecognized laboratory-acquired infections, 
absenteeism must be systematically evaluated for laboratorians, laboratory 
supervisors, laboratory support individuals, or those who, because of 
official duties, have occasion to enter certain laboratories working with 
hazardous agents. Each of these persons must be knowledgeable of the signs 
and symptoms of the diseases caused by hazardous agents worked with in 
laboratories to which they are exposed. Absent employees must notify or 
otherwise inform the supervisor of the nature of the absence. If an 
employee fails to contact the supervisor, the supervisor should be 
responsible for determining the reason for the absence. Although absentee 
reporting probably need not go beyond the level of the immediate supervisor 
for those working with Class I or II agents, immediate consultation with 
the CDC Medical Epidemiologist in the Office of Biosafety should be sought 
for those working with Class IV and perhaps Class III agents. Efforts to 
exclude the possibility of laboratory acquired infection should be more 
rigorous with agents in higher classes; special diagnostic resources at the 
CDC should be made available to individuals working with them.
Entries into restricted areas without appropriate immunizations must 
also be reported and monitored. Such entries would automatically be 
minimized with limited access and with a system (such as color coded badges 
and laboratory entrance doors) that would permit easy identification of 
infractions of immunization requirements. The individual's prompt 
reporting is dependent upon 1) knowledge that such an entry is hazardous,
2) knowledge of immunization status, and 3) motivation to report the 
incident should the entry have been unobserved. An assessment must be 
made. The risks posed to that individual must be assessed, with the agent 
class and the status of laboratory work at that time taken into account.
E £ £ if i is n a is 3 -Jj3_ y is . P r sg.en t -S.vs.fc-srn
The results of the Task Force investigation on existing practices 
regarding medical surveillance and medical care very clearly document 
serious deficiencies. Data sources included personal interviews, the 
laboratory safety questionnaire survey, written comments submitted with the 
laboratory safety questionnaire, and a review of laboratory accidents and
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infections at the CDC. For discussion purposes, the results of the investi­
gation are conveniently divided into the following topics: 1) reporting,
2) accident and illness investigations, and 3) medical care.
6.g.PQ.rtln.^
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The disturbingly high frequency of unreported laboratory-acquired 
infections at the CDC has been discussed above. Of 23 laboratory-acquired 
infections occurring in the period 1970-73, only 9 were officially reported 
to the Office of Biosafety; the remainder were disclosed only after 
personal interviews with laboratorians. The number of unreported illnesses 
in the period 1974-76 is unknown, since no interviews were conducted for 
this period. However, 1 swine influenza infection occurring in 1976, which 
is on record in the Bureau of Employee Compensation, was unknown to the 
Office of Biosafety.
The potential consequences of unreported illnesses are readily 
apparent. No systematic investigation can be undertaken to determine the 
source of infection; there is opportunity for further illnesses in other 
workers. Prophylaxis of co-workers who may have had a similar exposure is 
neglected. Finally, there is no way to interrupt a potential person-to- 
person or person-to-vector transmission cycle.
Serious deficiencies were also disclosed in the reporting of 
laboratory accidents for all groups targeted by the laboratory safety 
questionnaire survey. Most notable were the responses of the laboratorians 
and laboratory supervisors. For the 6 months covered by the questionnaire, 
383 laboratorians admitted to a total of 352 unreported accidents. This is 
an unquestionably large number of incidents which did not even receive the 
benefit of supervisory evaluation. Similar deficiencies have been 
documented in the supervisor's willingness to report accidents to the 
Office of Biosafety.
Reports of entries into restricted laboratory areas without 
appropriate immunizations are rarely reported to the Office of Biosafety, 
though questionnaire responses documented this to be a fairly common 
infraction. From January 1970-March 1977, only 1 such incident is 
officially on record in the Office of Biosafety. For the 6 month period 
covered by the laboratory safety survey questionnaire, however, 16 of 130 
(12.3%) Group 1 individuals, (i.e., non-laboratory and non- laboratory 
support personnel), entering laboratories claim to have entered restricted 
areas without the benefit of immunizations required for laboratorians.
AgQidenL.anfl
An important part of effective accident and illness investigation 
involves ready access to a log of agents being used in the laboratory.
Such a log, updated daily, would be particularly valuable in determining 
whether an illness in a laboratorian could be due to an agent being used in 
the laboratory. Only 32.6/6 of supervisors, however, were aware of a
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separate log record of agents being used each day in their laboratories.
In marked contrast, a higher proportion of supervisors felt that such a log 
should be kept, with strong correlation according to agent class: Class 1 
and 2, 31%; Class 3, 44.4%; and Class 4, 85.7$.
Only 43.8$ of supervisors stated that active efforts were system­
atically undertaken to determine if an illness in an employee represented a 
potential laboratory-acquired infection, regardless of agent class. In 
contrast, 67.9$ of the supervisors indicated that they were primarily 
responsible for initially determining if an illness might be related to a 
laboratory exposure. A suspected laboratory-acquired infection in an 
employee absent from work, however, generally resulted in a much greater 
willingness on the part of the supervisor to arrange, or refer the employee 
to sources of medical consultation and evaluation. The perceived 
responsibilities of laboratory supervisors increased with increasing agent 
class.
A disturbingly low proportion (40.5$) of laboratory supervisors were 
satisfied with the follow-up of accidents reported to the Office of 
Biosafety. Paradoxically, more of those working with Class 3 or 4 agents 
were satisfied than were those working with less hazardous agent. The 
percentages and classes were: 24$, Class 1 and 2 agents; 53.3$, Class 3; 
and 46.7$, Class 4. Likewise, only 48$ of laboratorians considered the 
Office of Biosafety a valuable resource in helping them perform their jobs 
in such a way as to provide maximum safety to themselves and others. 
Perceptions on the adequacy of the Laboratory Accident Investigation Board 
were too few to be reliably judged. These observations underscore the need 
for the expansion of the staff and skills of the office of Biosafety.
Msdiaal-gacs
The rapid detection of possible laboratory-acquired illness depends, 
in part, on the worker's awareness of signs and symptoms to be expected 
from infection with the agents with which he is working. Only 55.4$ of 134 
laboratory supervisors, however, knew that their employees were informed of 
such symptoms and signs. Surprisingly, there is no trend with agent class.
CDC supervisory referral practices and attitudes indicated a lack of 
confidence in the CDC Clinic's ability to diagnose and manage rare 
infectious diseases. In instances of suspected laboratory-acquired 
infection, 76.9$ of supervisors sought or directed employees to seek 
medical evaluation from CDC clinic physicians. However, there was clearly 
an increasing trend for supervisors to utilize alternative medical 
resources with increasing agent class (Table 2).
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Sources of Medical Evaluation Utilized in 
Instances of Suspected Laboratory-Acquired Infection
Aftent Class
S9,ur<?e 1 and 2 _3_ JL.
Clinic 83$ 77$ 50$
Other CDC Physician 12$ 20$ 44$
Private M.D. 5$ 0$ 6$
Other 0$ 3$ 0$
Although there was an apparent increasing awareness by supervisors 
that diagnostic expertise for rare agents might be found other than at the 
CDC Clinic, these supervisors provided no more diagnostic services for 
their employees than those working with lower agent classes.
The lack of consistency in providing diagnostic laboratory services 
for employees with suspected infections, the infrequency with which 
employees are instructed about symptoms expected from illness due to agents 
in their laboratories, and the lack of consistent referral patterns, 
underscore the need for much clearer policies and instructions in these 
matters.
Proposals
The Task Force on Biosafety has identified serious deficiencies in 
medical surveillance and medical care of CDC employees. Adequate 
safeguards against infection fall short of what the Task Force has 
determined to be the minimum procedural guidelines to be followed for 
laboratory accidents, laboratory infection, absenteeism, and unauthorized 
laboratory entries. There is a lack of consistency regarding medical care 
of proved, suspect, or potential cases of laboratory-acquired infection.
To correct deficiencies documented in the preceding material, the Task 
Force proposes that a medical officer trained in epidemiology and 
infectious diseases, with a supporting staff of Biohazard Control Officers 
from the Office of Biosafety be assigned the specific responsibilities of 
medical surveillance and coordination of medical care. The duties of the 
medical officer would solely involve biosecurity responsibilities and in 
conjunction with the Biohazard Control committee would include:
1. Developing an efficient and effective reporting system for 
accidents and infections.
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2. Refining standard definitions and/or procedural guidelines for the 
following reportable items:
a. High-risk laboratory accidents
b. Entries into restricted areas without appropriate 
immunizations
c. Absenteeism
3. Identifying the population at risk, given either accidental 
exposure or infection.
4. Monitoring those identified in Item 3
5. Acting as an infectious diseases consultant (but not a primary 
care physician) for individuals with suspected laboratory-acquired 
illness, arranging for the collection and distribution of 
appropriate diagnostic specimens, and recommending prophylaxis if 
indicated and if available.
6. Triaging to appropriate quarantine or hospital facilities those 
individuals with suspected or documented infection in which 
person-to-person and/or person-to-vector spread pose a threat.
7. Assisting in the coordination of investigations of infections, 
facilities, equipment, and procedures.
8. Assisting the Systematic monitoring of safety practices and 
policies.
9. Determining yearly accident and infection rates at CDC.
10. Developing a sign-in, sign-out policy for laboratorians and others 
having responsibilities requiring them to enter certain 
laboratories.
11. Cooperating with a variety of persons with different skills and 
interests will be required for the successful operation of the 
medical epidemiologist and his staff. One way of enhancing 
cooperation and ensuring the input of the views and interests of a 
variety of organizational units is the formation of a Biohazard 
Control Committee. Representatives knowledgeable in epidemiology, 
clinical infectious disease, various subspeciality areas of 
microbiology, and environmental control should serve as committee 
members. In addition, management and organizations providing 
support services to laboratories should be represented. The 
medical epidemiologist would report data, problems, and activities 
to the committee on a regular (probably monthly) basis. The 
committee, or subcommittees thereof, would assist in the 
development of standards, guidelines, and policies. The committee 
should regularly prepare a report for the Center Director. The
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report should succinctly summarize deliberations, actions, and 
recommendations of the committee. Copies of the report should be 
distributed to each major organizational unit represented on the 
committee as well as to those specific divisions, branches, 
sections, and units that have been requested by the committee to 
undertake actions.
Additional functions of the medical epidemiologist would include agent 
registration, immunization, monitoring, and periodic review of facilities 
and equipment. A long range plan must include national surveillance.
The assessment of the risk of acquiring an infection given either a 
laboratory accident, entry into a restricted area without immunizations, or 
absenteeism would involve a knowledge of agents being used in that 
particular laboratory or facility. Agent registration is a concept already 
being put to practical use at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) (2). 
There is a need to review the program at NIH and to adopt a similar program 
for the CDC.
Current knowledge of the immune status of workers having contact with 
laboratories is an indispensable facet of both medical care and medical 
surveillance of employees. There is clearly a need for a centralized, 
current, and efficient mechanism to monitor the immunization status of 
employees.
The adequacy of existing medical facilities and medical personnel must 
be systematically reviewed. The intent of the review should be to provide 
a basis for recommending appropriate changes that will guarantee the 
availability of expert medical care for individuals at risk of acquiring 
and/or transmitting a laboratory infection.
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